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Abstract
We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Cham-
berlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that
the “sum of misrepresentations” is minimized. The winner determination problem for both
systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are
variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be
solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepre-
sentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively
two new rules. In the general case these “minimax” versions of classical rules appeared to
be still NP-hard.
We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two clas-
sical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of
positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parame-
ter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners.
For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide poly-
nomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains
NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.
1. Introduction
There is an important conceptual difference in the purpose of single-winner and multi-
winner elections. Single-winner social choice rules are used to make final decisions, e.g., to
elect a president or to choose a certain course of action. The multi-winner election rules
are used to elect an assembly whose members will be authorized to take final decisions on
behalf of the society. As a result the main property that multi-winner rules have to satisfy
is that the elected assembly represents the society adequately. This, in particular, means
that when a final decision is taken all opinions existing in the society are heard and taken
into consideration. As Black powerfully expressed it:
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A scheme of proportional representation attempts to secure an assembly whose
membership will, so far as possible, be proportionate to the volume of the dif-
ferent shades of political opinion held throughout the country; the microcosm is
to be a true reflexion of the macrocosm (Black, 1958, p. 75).
And although any single-winner social choice rule can be easily extended to select an
assembly—e.g., by choosing candidates with best scores or applying the rule repeatedly until
the required quantity of representatives is elected—this is a wrong approach to the problem
(Brams & Fishburn, 2002) (see also Lu & Boutilier, 2011 for some experimental evidence).
The reason is that the majoritarian logic which dominates the design of single-winner social
choice rules cannot provide for a balanced assembly membership.
The standard solution to the problem of electing an assembly has been the division of
the election into single-member districts with approximately equal population. Each district
elects one member of the assembly using a single-winner rule, normally the plurality. And
although one might question whether districting should be instead based on the total adult
population or on the number of registered voters, the current practice is well established and
entrenched by law in many countries, including the United States (Brams, 2008). However
the main problem with this approach is not the districting but the fact that it also fails to
give a representation to minorities; a minority may comprise 49% of the population and be
not represented in the assembly. On the positive side the districting method provides for a
high level of accountability: voters who know who is their representative, can address them
on particular issues and can even recall them, if they fail to represent them to a decent
standard.
Various voting systems—e.g., Cumulative Voting, Single Non-Transferable vote, multi-
winner variants of Single Transferable Vote, various party list systems—have been designed
to solve the problem of representation of minorities (Brams & Fishburn, 2002). However
none of them scored high on the accountability. It may even seem that we have a certain
trade-off here and we cannot have both representation of minorities and accountability.
However this is not the case. An important idea was suggested by Charles Dodgson (1884),
known also as Lewis Carroll, and considered in a different form by Black (1958). Then the
idea was further developed by Chamberlin and Courant (1983) and later by Monroe (1995).
The relative advantages of both methods from political science point of view have been
extensively discussed by Brams (2008). Dodgson asserted that a representation system
should find the coalitions in the election that would have formed if the voters had the
necessary time and information and allow each of the coalitions to elect their representative.
If this is adopted, then a sizable minority can form a coalition and be represented.
The realization of this idea required a new concept which is the concept of misrepresen-
tation. It is assumed that voters form individual preferences over the candidates based on
their political ideology and “their judgement about the abilities of candidates to participate
in deliberations and decision making consistent with how the individuals would wish to act
were they present” (Chamberlin & Courant, 1983, p. 722). This was in a way a revolution.
Indeed, in the “single-winner” literature on voting rules it is widely accepted that
voter’s political preferences are more complex than their first choices alone. However,
in “multi-winner” voting literature fixation on first preferences led researchers to think
about proportional representation exclusively in terms of first preferences. In list systems
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of proportional representation, parties are assigned a number of seats in parliament that
is proportional to the number of votes (first preferences) they received. The systems like
Single Non-Transferable Vote, Block Voting and Cumulative Voting also do not take sec-
ond preferences in account (Levin & Nalebuff, 1995). Only the Single Transferable Vote
is a system of proportional representation—in fact a family of voting methods according
to Tideman and Richardson (2000)—that allows voters to express the order of preference
of candidates (Levin & Nalebuff, 1995). Voters rank the candidates in order of preference;
first preference votes are the first to be looked at, and the votes are then transferred, if
necessary, from candidates who have either been comfortably elected or who have done so
badly that they have been eliminated from the election.1
So, if a voter is represented by a candidate who is her first preference it is reasonable to
say that she is represented optimally or that the misrepresentation in this case is zero. In
general, if a voter is represented by a candidate who is her ith preference we may assume
that she is misrepresented to the degree si. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that
0 = s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sm. So in this case the rule for measuring the total misrepresentation
is fully defined by the vector s = (s1, . . . , sm), where m is the number of candidates.
Using the analogy with positional scoring rules for single-winner elections we may say that
this misrepresentation function is positional. In general, the problem of choosing a proper
misrepresentation function is far from being trivial. In the work of Levin and Nalebuff (1995,
p. 4) this difficulty is vividly illustrated: “if the electorate is uniformly distributed on the
segment between 0 and 1, and we are to choose three representatives, should they be equally
spaced [0.25, 0.5, 0.75], or should they be selected so as to minimize the average distance
traveled to the nearest legislator [0.16, 0.5, 0.83]?” In the broadest possible framework the
misrepresentation function may be even voter-dependent.
Staying with the classical positional misrepresentation functions for the time being sup-
pose that every voter is assigned to a representative in some way. Measuring the total
misrepresentation for the whole society we may adopt either the Harsanyi (1995) approach
or the Rawlsian one (assuming that the utility of being represented by the ith best can-
didate is −si, i.e., a nonpositive value). By Harsanyi we will have to measure the total
misrepresentation as
MH =
m∑
i=1
nisi,
where ni is the number of voters represented by their ith most preferred candidate. Ac-
cording to Rawls (1999) “welfare is maximized when the utility of those society members
that have the least is the greatest.” This leads to the total misrepresentation function
MR = max
i with ni>0
si.
Both Chamberlin and Courant (1983), and Monroe (1995) consider that the best set of
representatives must minimize the total misrepresentation which they both calculate using
the Borda vector of scores, that is, (0, 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1) and Harsanyi’s misrepresentation
1. In Northern Ireland this is the voting system used for elections to local councils, the Assembly, and the
European Parliament. It is used for all elections in the Irish Republic, Malta, and Australia (although
single-member constituencies are prevalent in Australia, apart from state level elections in Tasmania and
the ACT). Several other countries have recently debated adopting it.
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function. Their methods are however different and the difference is very important. Cham-
berlin and Courant did not impose any restriction on the function that assigns candidates
to voters. This may potentially lead to a different number of voters represented by each
candidate. To remedy this Chamberlin and Courant suggested to use weighted voting in
the assembly where each elected candidate has the weight equal to the number of voters
they represent. Monroe rejected this approach and insisted on the principle ’one member
of assembly one vote’. For this reason he insisted that the difference between the numbers
of voters assigned to any two representatives is at most one.
The reasons why Monroe rejected the Chamberlin and Courant approach are quite
substantial. Proportional allocation of weights is known to result in excessive voting powers
for the electorates of larger constituencies and there can be much debate on what is the right
way of allocating weights to representatives. An alternative to Chamberlin and Courant’s
method would be to give to representatives weights proportional to the square root of the
number of voters they represent. This is justified by the fact, that due to the square root
law of Penrose (1946), the a priori voting power (as defined by the Penrose-Banzhaf index)
of a member of a voting body is inversely proportional to the square root of its size. On the
basis of this theory, for example, Poland insisted that the EU allocate Council-of-Minister
votes according to the square root of each nation’s population (Slomczynski & Zyczkowski,
2006).
The computational problems which the Harsanyi approach entails are known to be
NP-hard (Lu & Boutilier, 2011; Procaccia, Rosenschein, & Zohar, 2008) for several classi-
cal misrepresentation functions. In this paper we try to achieve tractability in multiwinner
elections in three different ways. Firstly, we ask whether or not the problem of finding an op-
timal fully proportional representation becomes easier for these classical misrepresentation
functions if we adopt the Rawlsian approach for measurement of total misrepresentation.
The second goal is to find the parameterized complexity of the aforementioned problems
for some natural choices of parameters. The third is to develop efficient algorithms for
achieving an optimal fully proportional representation in single-peaked elections.
In the remainder of this section, we formally introduce the computational problems
considered in this paper, summarize the results in the extant literature, and describe our
approaches and results.
1.1 Computational Problems Considered
An election is a pair E = (C, V ) where C is a set of candidates (or alternatives) and V is an
ordered list of voters. Each voter is represented by her vote, which is a strict, linear order
over the set of candidates (also called this voter’s preference order). We will refer to the
list V as a preference profile, and we denote the number of voters in V by n. The number
of alternatives will be denoted by m. If the order of voters is not important (the election
is anonymous), then V can be considered as a multiset2 of votes. In this paper we will
consider only anonymous elections.
By posv(c) we will denote the position of the alternative c in the ranking of voter v; the
top-ranked alternative has position 1, the second best has position 2, etc.
2. This is not a set since two different voters may have the same preference order.
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Definition 1. Given a profile V over C, a mapping r : V × C → Q+0 will be called a
misrepresentation function if for any v ∈ V and any two candidates c, c′ ∈ C the condition
posv(c) < posv(c
′) implies r(v, c) ≤ r(v, c′).
This is to say that if c is preferred to c′ in v’s ranking, then the misrepresentation of v,
when she is represented by c′ will be at least as large as her misrepresentation, when she
is represented by c. In the classical framework the misrepresentation of a candidate for a
voter is a function of the position of the candidate in the preference order of that voter
given by s = (s1, . . . , sm), i.e., the misrepresentation function in this case will be
r(v, c) = spos
v
(c).
An important particular case is the Borda misrepresentation function defined by the vector
(0, 1, . . . ,m− 1).
In the approval voting framework, if a voter is represented by a candidate whom she
approves, her misrepresentation is considered to be zero, otherwise it is equal to one. This
function is called the approval misrepresentation function. This misrepresentation func-
tion does not have to be positional since different voters may approve different number of
candidates. Note that some misrepresentation functions, like Borda, can be derived from
the preference lists of the voters. In contrast, an approval misrepresentation function can-
not be obtained from a preference list without further information about the threshold
that separates approved candidates from disapproved ones. In the general framework the
misrepresentation function may be arbitrary.
By w : V → C we denote the function that assigns voters to representatives (or the
other way around), i.e., under this assignment voter v is represented by candidate w(v).
The total misrepresentation of the election under w is then given by∑
v∈V
r(v,w(v)) or max
v∈V
r(v,w(v))
in the Harsanyi’s classical and Rawls’ minimax versions, respectively. We say that a map-
ping w respects the M -criterion (or Monroe criterion) if |w(V )| = k and w assigns at least
⌊n/k⌋ and at most ⌈n/k⌉ voters to every candidate from w(V ), where k is the total number
of representatives to be elected to the assembly. Note that in case of the M -criterion a set
of more than k winners might lead to a higher misrepresentation than a set of k winners.
For example, consider an election such that all voters favour the same candidate but the
set of winners that has to be elected is greater than one.
Based on the previous discussion, in this work we investigate the computational com-
plexity of the following four combinatorial problems. The two classical ones described above
are named after Chamberlin and Courant (CC), for the case when a candidate can repre-
sent an arbitrary number of voters (and this number of voters will be his weight in the
elected assembly), and Monroe (M), for the case when every candidate represents roughly
the same number of voters (and each representative has one vote in the assembly). The two
previously unstudied versions which adopt the Rawlsian approach for measuring the total
misrepresentation are called the minimax versions of the classical ones.
CC-Multiwinner (CC-MW)
Given: A set C of candidates, a multiset V of voters, a misrepresentation
function r, a misrepresentation bound R ∈ Q+0 and a positive integer k.
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Task: Find a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size k and an assignment of voters w such that
w(V ) = C ′ and
∑
v∈V r(v,w(v)) ≤ R.
Minimax CC-Multiwinner (Minimax CC-MW)
Given: A set C of candidates, a multiset V of voters, a misrepresentation
function r, a misrepresentation bound R ∈ Q+0 and a positive integer k.
Task: Find a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size k and an assignment of voters w such that
w(V ) = C ′ and maxv∈V r(v,w(v)) ≤ R.
M-Multiwinner (M-MW)
Given: A set C of candidates, a multiset V of voters, a misrepresentation
function r, a misrepresentation bound R ∈ Q+0 and a positive integer k.
Task: Find a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size k and an assignment of voters w, which
respects the M -criterion, w(V ) = C ′ and such that
∑
v∈V r(v,w(v)) ≤ R.
Minimax M-Multiwinner (Minimax M-MW)
Given: A set C of candidates, a multiset V of voters, a misrepresentation
function r, a misrepresentation bound R ∈ Q+0 and a positive integer k.
Task: Find a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size k and an assignment of voters w, which
respects the M -criterion, w(V ) = C ′ and such that maxv∈V r(v,w(v)) ≤ R.
Note that finding an assignment of voters to a fixed set of k winners can be accom-
plished in polynomial time for all four problems by applying network flow algorithms (see
Section 3.2). Hence, in what follows we assume that k < m and k < n since otherwise all
four problems can be decided in polynomial time. We also note that all problems considered
are contained in NP since one can guess a set of k winners and a corresponding “mapping”
to the voters and check in polynomial time whether it satisfies the corresponding conditions.
The four problems above are stated for general misrepresentation functions (since some
of our algorithmic results hold even for this case) but the main focus of this work is on the
Borda and the approval ones.
1.2 Previous Computational Complexity Results
The study of the computational complexity of problems in the context of voting was initi-
ated by Bartholdi III, Tovey, and Trick (1989) about 20 years ago but has became an active
area of research only recently (Conitzer, 2010; Faliszewski & Procaccia, 2010; Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, & Hemaspaandra, 2010; Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, &
Rothe, 2009b). While there is a large number of papers dealing with single-winner elections
or multi-winner elections whose final goal is still to choose a single winner after a tiebreak-
ing, only few articles (Potthof & Brams, 1998; Procaccia et al., 2008; Lu & Boutilier,
2011) deal with the computational complexity of Multiwinner elections aimed at achieving
a proportional representation. In particular, these works contain NP-hardness proofs for
CC-Multiwinner and M-Multiwinner for approval misrepresentation function (Pro-
caccia et al., 2008) and for CC-Multiwinner for Borda misrepresentation function (Lu &
Boutilier, 2011). Algorithmic approaches comprise Integer Linear Programming (Potthof &
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Brams, 1998; Brams, 2008) for CC-MW and M-MW, approximation algorithms based on
greedy strategies (Lu & Boutilier, 2011) for CC-MW, and polynomial-time algorithms for
CC-MW and M-MW for instances where the number of candidates is constant (Procaccia
et al., 2008). In contrast, to the best of our knowledge, the computational complexity of
the minimax versions of the problems remained unstudied.
We are only aware of one further work explicitly studying computational complexity
issues in the context of multiwinner elections. Meir, Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar
(2008) investigate the computational complexity of strategic voting for several multiwinner
elections for which a winner can be determined in polynomial time. The systems considered
do not lead to any kind of proportional representation.
1.3 Our Approach and Results for General Elections
Our first result is that the minimax versions of the classical Chamberlin-Courant and Mon-
roe problems are also NP-complete. In other words, adopting the Rawlsian approach does
not make computation of the problems easier in general (but we will see that the situ-
ation changes completely for single-peaked elections where the minimax version becomes
easier indeed). Based on these negative results, this work aims at extending the previous
algorithmic approaches described above by an analysis whether or not there are settings
in which the problems become tractable. To this end, parameterized algorithmics is an
appropriate tool as it aims at identifying tractable special cases of NP-hard problems. The
cornerstone of this approach is the idea that the complexity of a problem is not only mea-
sured in the total size of an input instance I but also in an additional parameter p, usually
a nonnegative integer (but it can be a pair of integers or virtually anything). A prob-
lem is called fixed-parameter tractable if there is an algorithm solving every instance of it
in f(p)·poly(|I|) time, where f is a computable function (Downey & Fellows, 1999; Flum
& Grohe, 2006; Niedermeier, 2006). For small values of p an algorithm with such running
time might represent an efficient algorithm for the NP-hard problem under consideration.
Parameterized complexity also provides a tool of “parameterized reductions” by which one
can show that a problem is presumably not fixed-parameter tractable. One of the most
important parameterized complexity classes for this purpose isW [2] (see Section 2 for more
details). We remark in passing that a parameterized complexity analysis has been em-
ployed for several other voting problems, (e.g., see Brandt, Brill, & Seedig, 2011; Betzler,
Guo, & Niedermeier, 2010; Betzler, Hemmann, & Niedermeier, 2009; Christian, Fellows,
Rosamond, & Slinko, 2007; Dorn & Schlotter, 2010; Elkind, Faliszewski, & Slinko, 2010b;
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe, 2009a and also Betzler, Bredereck,
Chen, & Niedermeier, 2012 for a survey).
In the context of multiwinner elections, a parameter that immediately attracts attention
is the number k of winners, which in many settings might be much smaller than the number
of candidates or the number of voters. Another reasonable parameter is the misrepresenta-
tion bound R since in an ideal (or fully personalizable Lu & Boutilier, 2011) situation R is
equal to zero, that is, every voter is represented by one of her most preferred candidates.
We provide a parameterized complexity analysis of all four considered problems for the
Borda and approval misrepresentation functions with respect to the parameters k and R.
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Parameter r CC-MW Minimax CC-MW M-MW Minimax M-MW
#winner k A W[2]-hard (♦) W[2]-hard (♦) W[2]-hard (♦) W[2]-hard (♦)
#winner k B W[2]-hard (△) W[2]-hard (△) W[2]-hard (△) W[2]-hard (△)
misr. R A NP-h for R = 0 (♦) NP-h for R = 0 (♦) NP-h for R = 0 (♦) NP-h for R = 0 (♦)
misr. R B XP (♣) NP-h for R ≥ 1 (♯) XP (♣) NP-h for R ≥ 1 (♯)
P for R = 0 (♯) P for R = 0 (♯)
(R, k) A W[2]-hard (♦) W[2]-hard (♦) W[2]-hard (♦) W[2]-hard (♦)
(R, k) B FPT (♥) FPT (♥) FPT (♠) FPT (†)
# cand. U FPT (♮) FPT (♮) FPT (♮) FPT (♮)
# voters U FPT (♭) FPT (♭) FPT (♭) FPT (♭)
Table 1: Parameterized complexity of the considered multiwinner problems for instances
where the misrepresentation function r is either approval (A), Borda (B) or unre-
stricted (U). Results are obtained as follows. ♦: Theorem 1,△: Theorem 2, ♣: The-
orem 3, ♯: Theorem 4, ♥: Theorem 5, ♠: Theorem 6, †: Theorem 7 ♭: Proposition 1,
♮ Proposition 2.
In addition, we also investigate the composite parameter (R, k) consisting of the number of
winners and the misrepresentation bound.
An overview of the results is provided in Table 1. When the number of winners k is
a parameter, all considered problems turn out to be W[2]-hard. For the parameterization
by the total misrepresentation bound R the results are more varied. For the case R = 0,
for the approval misrepresentation function all four problems are NP-hard while they are
solvable in polynomial time for the Borda misrepresentation function. However, Minimax
CC-MW and Minimax M-MW become NP-hard for every R ≥ 1. In contrast, the sum-
minimization variants CC-MW and M-MW for the Borda misrepresentation function are
solvable in polynomial time for constant R (the corresponding parameterized complexity
class is called XP). Note that the provided algorithm shows the containment in XP with
respect to R but not fixed-parameter tractability, this problem remains open. This inspired
our analysis of the composite parameter (R, k), covering scenarios in which there is a small
set of winners that can represent all voters with a small total misrepresentation. While
for the approval misrepresentation function, this still leads to parameterized intractabil-
ity, for the Borda misrepresentation function, we show fixed-parameter tractability for all
considered problems. To complete the picture of a multivariate complexity analysis, we
additionally provide fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the parameters “number
of voters” and “number of candidates”.
1.4 Results for Single-Peaked Elections
Single-peakedness is one of the central notions in social choice and political science alike
(Black, 1958; Moulin, 1991; Tideman, 2006). The preferences of voters are single-peaked
when a single issue dominates their formation. This could be their ideological position on
the Left-Right or Liberal-Conservative spectra, level of taxation, immigration quota, etc.
Tideman compares single-peakedness with convexity of preferences and discusses when it is
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CC-MW Minimax CC-MW M-MW Minimax M-MW
O(nm2) ♦ O(nm) ♣ O(n3m3k3) for approval ♠ O(n3m3k3) ♥
NP-h for integer mis. func. △
Table 2: Overview of the computational complexity for singled-peaked elections. In the case
of polynomial-time solvability, the table provides the running times depending
on the number n of voters, the number m of candidates, and the number k of
winners. If not stated otherwise, the result holds for an arbitrary misrepresentation
function. ♦: Theorem 8, ♣: Proposition 4, ♠: Theorem 10, ♥: Proposition 5,
△: Theorem 11.
reasonable to assume this. He refers to a data collection containing 87 ranked-ballot real-life
elections, which he has access to, and claims that most of them are single-peaked.
This single dominating issue is normally represented by an axis and each voter is char-
acterized by a single point on this axis (see an example on Figure 1. The misrepresentation
function for a fixed voter is then a function of a single variable defined on that axis. The
single-peakedness of preferences implies that this function has exactly one local minimum.
We refer to Section 5 for a formal proof of this statement.
We note that for votes in the form of approval ballots as well as linear orders, single-
peakedness of the profile can be checked in linear time (Booth & Lueker, 1976; Escoffier,
Lang, & O¨ztu¨rk, 2008) with the reconstruction of the order of the candidates on the axis.
In the case of single-peaked profiles some computational problems have turned out to
allow for more efficient solving strategies than in the general case (Brandt, Brill, Hemas-
paandra, & Hemaspaandra, 2010; Conitzer, 2009). In particular, the study of the com-
putational complexity of voting rules with NP-hard winner-determination problem shows
that for all Condorcet-consistent ones—and these include Dodgson, Kemeny, and Young
rules—the winner-determination problem becomes polynomial-time solvable if we restrict
ourselves to single-peaked profiles (Brandt et al., 2010). The obvious reason for this is that
single-peakedness eliminates the possibility of Condorcet cycles in the election profile.
It is not that obvious that single-peakedness must also simplify the winner-determination
problem for methods of proportional representation. However, it seems natural to inves-
tigate this possibility. Our results show that in many instances the winner-determination
problem for methods of proportional representation does indeed become easier too.
Our results are summarized in Table 2. For CC-MW and Minimax CC-MW the prob-
lems are solvable in polynomial time for an arbitrary misrepresentation function. More
specifically, for CC-MW we provide a dynamic programming algorithm running in O(nm2)
time for n voters and m candidates, and Minimax CC-MW can be solved in O(nm) time
by a greedy algorithm. For the Monroe system and its variants, the results become more
diverse. While Minimax M-MW for the general misrepresentation function is still solvable
in polynomial time, M-MW is NP-hard. However, on the positive side, we can still show
polynomial-time solvability for M-MW for the approval misrepresentation function. Basi-
cally, the results are obtained as follows. For M-MW for the approval misrepresentation
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function we establish a close connection to a “one-dimensional rectangle stabbing” prob-
lem with capacities. This allows to provide a dynamic programming algorithm based on a
decomposition property provided by Even, Levi, Rawitz, Schieber, Shahar, and Sviridenko
(2008). This result can be transferred to Minimax M-MW. The NP-hardness of M-MW
is established by a many-one reduction from a restricted version of the Exact 3-Cover
problem. The NP-hardness holds for an integer-valued misrepresentation function for which
the maximum misrepresentation value is still polynomial in the number of candidates. How-
ever, we need to allow situations in which a voter may be equally misrepresented by several
candidates. Hence, it is not clear how to transfer the corresponding many-one reduction
to M-MW for the Borda misrepresentation function. For this problem the computational
complexity is left open.
1.5 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the main concepts of param-
eterized complexity and some graph problems. Section 3 contains basic observations about
the relations of the four problems under consideration and fixed-parameter tractability re-
sults with respect to the number of voters and the number of candidates. The two main
contributions are proved in Section 4 and Section 5. In Section 4, we present our main pa-
rameterized complexity results as well as the NP-hardness results for the minimax versions.
In Section 5, the special case of single-peaked elections is handled. Finally, in Section 6 we
conclude with a discussion of the relevance of our results and some related problems and
settings.
2. Preliminaries
We briefly introduce the framework of parameterized complexity followed by some basic
graph problems that are employed in this paper. For basic notions regarding classical
complexity theory we refer to Garey and Johnson (1979).
2.1 Parameterized Complexity
The concept of parameterized complexity was pioneered by Downey and Fellows (1999). See
also the textbooks by Flum and Grohe (2006) and Niedermeier (2006). The fundamental
goal is to find out whether the seemingly unavoidable combinatorial explosion, occurring in
exact algorithms for NP-hard problems, can be confined to certain problem-specific param-
eters. The idea is that when such a parameter in a real-life application is restricted to small
values only, then an algorithm with a running time that is exponential exclusively with
respect to the parameter may be efficient and practical. We now provide formal definitions.
Definition 2. A parameterized problem is a language L ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ∗, where Σ is a finite
alphabet. The second component is called the parameter of the problem.
Basically, this means that an input to a parameterized problem is a pair (x, p), where x
can be considered as the “main input” and p is a parameter of the problem. We consider
parameters which are positive integers or “composite” parameters that are tuples of several
positive integers.
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Definition 3. A parameterized problem L is fixed-parameter tractable if there is an al-
gorithm that decides in f(p) · |x|O(1) time whether (x, p) ∈ L, where f is an arbitrary
computable function that depends only on p. The complexity class of all fixed-parameter
tractable problems is called FPT.
Unfortunately, not all parameterized problems are fixed-parameter tractable. To this
end, Downey and Fellows (1999) developed a theory of parameterized intractability by
means of a completeness program with complexity classes. More specifically, they defined
the so-called W -hierarchy by using Boolean circuits. This hierarchy consists of the following
classes:
FPT ⊆W[1] ⊆W[2] ⊆ . . . ⊆W[Sat] ⊆W[P] ⊆ XP
(we refer the reader to the book by Downey & Fellows, 1999, for their precise description).
In particular, we stress that the concept of fixed-parameter tractability is different from
the notion of “polynomial-time solvability for constant p” since an algorithm running in
O(|x|p) time does not imply fixed-parameter tractability. All problems that can be solved
in the running time O(|x|f(p)) for a computable function f form the complexity class called
XP.
The containment W[1] ⊆ FPT would not imply P = NP as such. It would imply,
however, the failure of the Exponential Time Hypothesis (Impagliazzo, Paturi, & Zane,
2001). Hence, it is commonly believed that W[1]-hard problems are not fixed-parameter
tractable. To show the W[t]-hardness of a problem for some positive integer t, the following
reduction concept was introduced.
Definition 4. Let L,L′ ⊆ Σ∗×Σ∗ be two parameterized problems. We say that L reduces
to L′ by a parameterized reduction if there are two computable functions h1 : Σ
∗ → Σ∗ and
h2 : N→ Q
+ and a function f : Σ∗ × Σ∗ → Σ∗ × Σ∗ such that for each (x, p) ∈ Σ∗ ×Σ∗
1. (x, p) ∈ L ⇐⇒ f(x, p) ∈ L′ and f is computable in time |x|O(1) · h2(|p|) and
2. if (x′, p′) = f(x, p), then p′ = h1(p).
Analogously to the case of NP-hardness, for any positive integer t, it suffices to give a
parameterized reduction from one W[t]-hard parameterized problem X to a parameterized
problem Y to show the W[t]-hardness of Y . For more details about parameterized com-
plexity theory we refer to the textbooks (Downey & Fellows, 1999; Flum & Grohe, 2006;
Niedermeier, 2006).
In this work, we only provide results regarding the second level of (presumable) pa-
rameterized intractability captured by the complexity class W[2]. Several parameterized
reductions in this work are from the W[2]-complete Hitting Set (HS) problem: Given a
family F = {F1, . . . , Fn} of sets over a universe U = {u1, . . . , um} and an integer k ≥ 0,
decide whether there is a hitting set U ′ ⊆ U of size at most k by which we understand a
set U ′ such that Fi ∩ U
′ 6= ∅ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. HS is NP-hard (Garey & Johnson, 1979)
and W[2]-hard with respect to parameter k (Downey & Fellows, 1999).
2.2 Graph Problems
Some of our algorithmic results employ algorithms for basic graph problems defined in the
following. An undirected graph is a pair G = (U,E), consisting of the set U of vertices
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and the set E of edges, where an edge is an unordered pair (size-two set) of vertices. Two
vertices u, v ∈ U are called adjacent if {u, v} ∈ E. For an undirected graph G = (U,E) and
a vertex u ∈ U , the neighborhood N(u) of u is the set of all vertices adjacent to u.
An undirected graph G = (U,E) is called bipartite if the vertex set U can be partitioned
into two nonintersecting subsets U1 and U2 such that E ⊆ {{u, v} | u ∈ U1 and v ∈ U2}. A
matching is an edge set E′ ⊆ E such that e ∩ e′ = ∅ for every two distinct edges e, e′ ∈ E′.
A maximum matching is a matching with maximum cardinality. In an undirected graph
where each edge {u, v} is associated with a weight w({u, v}) a maximum-weight matching
is a matching E′ such that
∑
{u,v}∈E′ w({u, v}) is maximal.
A directed graph or a directed network is a pair G = (U,A), consisting of the set U
of vertices and the set A ⊆ U × U of directed edges (or arcs) where each directed edge
is an ordered pair of vertices. A flow network is a directed network G = (U,A) with
two distinguished vertices s ∈ U (the source) and t ∈ U (the sink or target) where each
arc (u, v) ∈ A is associated with a nonnegative number c(u, v), called capacity. Roughly
speaking, a flow is a function f that assigns a real value f(u, v) with 0 ≤ f(u, v) ≤ c(u, v)
to every arc (u, v) ∈ A and satisfies the constraints that for every vertex v except for the
source and the sink the total flow into v equals the total flow out of v. See the textbook
of Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein (2001) for details. A maximum flow is a flow such
that the total flow into the sink is maximal.
In this paper, we make use of the fact that a maximum-weight matching in a bipartite
graph as well as a maximum flow in general graphs can be computed in polynomial time
by standard graph algorithms (e.g., see Cormen et al., 2001).
3. Basic Results and Observations
In this section, we shed light on the combinatorial relations between the problems and
investigate the parameterized complexity of the considered problems with respect to the
parameters “number of voters” and “number of candidates”. These results will also be
employed in the following sections. In particular, some of the algorithms showing fixed-
parameter tractability will be used as “subroutines” in Section 4 to obtain fixed-parameter
tractability with respect to other parameterizations.
3.1 Relations between the Problems
Although all four problems come with different properties in general, in some special cases,
some of them coincide. One such example is the so-called fully personalizable setting (Lu
& Boutilier, 2011), that is, the case when the misrepresentation bound R is zero and hence
every voter has to be represented by one of her best alternatives (i.e., one of those for which
the misrepresentation is zero). Clearly, asking for a set of winners and an assignment for
which the sum of misrepresentations is zero is equivalent to asking for a set of winners and
an assignment for which the maximum misrepresentation value is zero. This leads to the
following observation.
Observation 1. For R = 0, Minimax M-Multiwinner coincides with M-Multiwinner
and Minimax CC-Multiwinner coincides with CC-Multiwinner.
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Moreover, for the two minimax versions of the problems, it only matters whether a
particular misrepresentation value exceeds the threshold R or not. Hence, an instance of
a minimax version with an arbitrary misrepresentation function r can be reduced to an
equivalent instance of the same problem with the approval misrepresentation function r′
as follows. For every voter v and every candidate c, set r′(v, c) = 1 if r(v, c) > R, and
r′(v, c) = 0 if r(v, c) ≤ R and, finally, set R′ := 0.
Observation 2. For a Minimax M-/CC-Multiwinner instance (C, V, r,R, k) with mis-
representation function r, there is an instance (C, V, r′, 0, k) with the approval misrepresen-
tation function r′ such that the new instance is a yes-instance if and only if the original
instance is a yes-instance.
As a direct consequence, for the minimax versions every algorithm for the approval mis-
representation function also applies to instances with general misrepresentation function.
Moreover, hardness results for an arbitrary misrepresentation function transfer to the ap-
proval misrepresentation function. Combining Observations 1 and 2, we conclude that an
algorithm for M-MW (CC-MW) for instances with R = 0 also solves the corresponding
minimax version for general misrepresentation function.
Finally, observe that a hardness result established for the approval misrepresentation
function can be directly transferred to the minimax version of the same problem if the
misrepresentation function is such that a voter is allowed to give an arbitrary number of
candidates a misrepresentation value of at most R. Note that this does not hold for the
Borda misrepresentation function where every voter v must specify exactly R+1 candidates
that can represent v with misrepresentation at most R.
3.2 The Numbers of Voters and Candidates as Parameters
We argue that all four problems considered are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to
the number of candidates as well as with respect to the number of voters. Our algorithms
are based on brute-force search combined with maximum flow and matching techniques.
First, we consider the parameterization by the number of voters. Then, we focus on the
parameterization by the number of candidates.
3.2.1 The Number of Voters as Parameter
We show that all considered multiwinner problems are fixed-parameter tractable when pa-
rameterized by the number n of voters. The basic idea is that an assignment of candidates
to voters induces a partition of the set of voters such that all voters in any set of this
partition are represented by the same candidate. Given a partition of the set of voters, the
best set of candidates for this partition can be found by the computation of a matching in
a bipartite auxiliary graph. Since we may try all O(kn) ⊆ O(nn) partitions of the set of
voters into k sets the resulting algorithm shows fixed-parameter tractability.
Proposition 1. (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner and (Minimax) M-Multiwinner can
be solved in nn · poly(n,m) time for an instance with n voters and m candidates.
Proof. First, we present a solution strategy for Minimax CC-MW. To find a set of k
winners, try all O(kn) partitions of the set of voters into k subsets. In the case of a yes-
instance of Minimax CC-MW, there must be a partition V1, . . . , Vk of the multiset of voters
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V as follows. For every Vi, all voters of Vi are assigned to the same candidate c of an optimal
set of k winners and no other voter is assigned to c. Hence, for every partition, it remains to
select k candidates, one candidate ci for every subset Vi, such that by assigning the voters
in Vi to ci the misrepresentation of any voter is at most R. For Minimax CC-MW the
set of candidates can be determined by computing a maximum-cardinality matching in the
following bipartite graph. One part of the graph represents the set of candidates and the
other part the set {V1, . . . , Vk}. Moreover, there is an edge between a vertex representing a
candidate c and a vertex representing a subset Vi if and only if r(v, c) ≤ R for all v ∈ Vi. It is
straightforward to verify that all voters can be represented with maximal misrepresentation
bound R if and only if there is a maximum-cardinality matching of size k (all vertices
representing the subsets are “matched”) in the constructed graph.
Regarding the running time, the computation of a maximum-weight matching in a
bipartite graph with nv vertices and ne edges can be accomplished in O(nv(ne+nv · log nv))
time (Fredman & Tarjan, 1987). Since the number of edges and vertices in the constructed
bipartite graph are polynomial in the number of candidates and k ≤ n, the claimed running
time follows.
Next, we focus on CC-MW. Again, we try all partitions of the voters into k subsets.
For every such partition, we compute a maximum-weight matching in the following edge-
weighted bipartite graph. One part consists of vertices corresponding to candidates and
the other part of vertices corresponding to the subsets of the partition V1, . . . , Vk of the
multiset of voters. Moreover, there is an edge between every vertex c and every vertex Vi
with weight T −
∑
v∈Vi
r(v, c), where T is a positive integer that is large enough to ensure
that all weights are positive. The crucial observation is that in a maximum-weight matching
every vertex from V1, . . . , Vk is matched since the edge weights are positive (here we assume
that k ≤ m). Hence, the computation of a maximum-weight matching yields a set of k
candidates “representing” the subsets of voters as good as possible. More specifically,
let W denote the weight of the maximum-weight matching. Then, kT − W is the total
misrepresentation under the corresponding assignment.
Finally, observe that for the two problems where the assignment of the voters to the
winners must fulfill theM -criterion we can proceed in the same way with the single exception
that we need only to consider partitions such that every subset contains at least ⌊n/k⌋ and
at most ⌈n/k⌉ voters. The running time bound follows in complete analogy to Minimax
CC-MW as discussed above.
3.2.2 The Number of Candidates as Parameter
For a fixed number of candidates all four considered multiwinner problems can be solved
efficiently. For (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner parameterized by the number m of candi-
dates fixed-parameter tractability is trivial: We can test all
(
m
k
)
≤ 2m subsets of candidates
and report a set of candidates with minimum total misrepresentation. To this end, one
assigns every voter v to the candidate of the considered subset that represents v in the
best possible way and then directly obtains the sum of misrepresentations or maximum
misrepresentation.
Clearly, such an assignment of the voters does not have to fulfill the M -criterion. How-
ever, for (Minimax) M-Multiwinner, one can apply network flow algorithms to find an
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optimal assignment of the voters to a size-k subset C ′ of the set of candidates (see the
Preliminaries in Subsection 2.2 for basic definitions regarding network flows).
For Minimax M-Multiwinner, construct a directed network with a vertex for every
candidate from C ′, one vertex for every voter, a source, and a sink vertex. There is an
arc with capacity ⌈n/k⌉ and lower bound of ⌊n/k⌋ from the source to every “candidate-
vertex”3. Moreover, there is a capacity-one arc from a “candidate-vertex” to a “voter-
vertex” if and only if the corresponding candidate can represent the corresponding voter
with misrepresentation at most R. Finally, there is an arc with capacity one from every
“voter-vertex” to the sink vertex. It is straightforward to verify that there is a network
flow of size n if and only if there is an assignment from the voters to C ′ that satisfies the
M -criterion and every voter is represented with misrepresentation at most R.
For M-Multiwinner, the construction given for the minimax version can be further
extended. In particular, it follows from Theorem 2 by Procaccia et al. (2008), that finding
an M -criterion fulfilling assignment from V to C ′ with minimum total misrepresentation
can be accomplished in polynomial time by the computation of a transportation problem
or, equivalently, by the computation of a minimum-weight maximum flow.
Proposition 2. (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner and (Minimax) M-Multiwinner can
be solved in O(2m · nm) and O(2m · poly(n,m)) time, respectively, for instances with m
candidates.
4. The Number of Winners and the Misrepresentation Bound as
Parameters
In this section, we show that all four problems for the approval and the Borda misrepre-
sentation functions are W[2]-hard with respect to the number of winners. For both mis-
representation functions we provide one parameterized reduction that works for all four
problems. We further investigate the misrepresentation bound R as parameter. While for
the approval misrepresentation function NP-hardness for R = 0 follows directly from the
parameterized reduction with respect to the number of winners, for the Borda misrepresen-
tation function, this parameter needs to be investigated separately. We show that CC-MW
and M-MW are in XP with respect to R, that is, they are solvable in polynomial time
when R is constant. However, the corresponding algorithm does not show fixed-parameter
tractability with respect to R. The question whether or not our result can be extended
to fixed-parameter tractability with respect to R is left open. We present, however, some
fixed-parameter tractability results with respect to the composite parameter (R, k) at the
end of this section. An overview of the results can be found in Table 1.
4.1 The Approval Misrepresentation Function
We provide a reduction from the W[2]-complete Hitting Set problem to establish W[2]-
hardness for all four problems. Before doing so, we discuss some related results. In the con-
ference paper (Procaccia, Rosenschein, & Zohar, 2007) it was stated that the NP-hardness
for CC-Multiwinner andM-Multiwinner follows from a reduction fromMax k-Cover
3. The problem variant with lower bounds (demands) can be solved in polynomial time by a simple reduction
to the normal flow problem (Ahuja, Magnanti, & Orlin, 1993, Section 6.7).
489
Betzler, Slinko, & Uhlmann
(omitting the problem definition and the construction) but in the subsequent journal pa-
per (Procaccia et al., 2008) the reduction was given from Exact 3-Cover. Although this
is sufficient to show NP-hardness, a reduction from Exact 3-Cover does not imply W[2]-
hardness. The reduction given here is conceptually similar but requires some additional
voters to deal with the fact that the sets of a Hitting Set instance might come with
different/unbounded size.
Theorem 1. For the approval misrepresentation function, (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner
and (Minimax) M-Multiwinner are W[2]-hard with respect to the number k of winners
even if R = 0. Minimax CC-Multiwinner and Minimax M-Multiwinner are NP-
complete.
Proof. First, we show W[2]-hardness for M-Multiwinner. Then, we argue that the pre-
sented reduction works for the other three problems as well.
Given an instance of Hitting Set (F = {F1, . . . , Fn}, U = {u1, . . . , um}, k), build an
instance of M-Multiwinner with set C of candidates as follows. There is a candidate ci ∈
C for every element ui ∈ U . The multiset of voters is VF ⊎D, where VF := {vF | F ∈ F}
is the multiset of voters indexed by F and |D| = n(k − 1) is a set of dummy voters.
Furthermore, for every F ∈ F and every ui ∈ U , let r(vF , ci) := 0 if ui ∈ F and r(vF , ci) :=
1, otherwise. Finally, for every d ∈ D and every ui ∈ U , set r(d, ci) := 0. This completes
the construction. For the correctness we show the following.
Claim. There is a hitting set of size k for F if and only if there is a winner set
of size k for M-Multiwinner that represents all voters with total misrepresen-
tation R = 0.
“⇒”: Let U ′ denote a size-k hitting set for F and C ′ := {ci | ui ∈ U
′}. We show that one can
build a mapping w : V → C ′ that respects theM -criterion and with total misrepresentation
zero. First, for every F ∈ F , set w(vF ) := ci for an arbitrary chosen element ui ∈ F ∩ U
′.
Clearly, r(vF , ci) = 0. So far, the n voters from VF are assigned to the candidates from C
′
and it remains to assign the n(k−1) voters fromD. Since each candidate in C ′ can represent
each dummy voter in D with misrepresentation zero, we can easily extend this assignment
so that each candidate from C ′ is assigned to exactly n voters.
“⇐”: Let C ′ ⊆ C denote a size-k winner set and let w be a mapping from V to C ′ such
that
∑
v∈V r(v,w(v)) = 0. Since a voter vF ∈ VF can only be represented with cost zero by
a candidate ci if ui ∈ F , the set U
′ := {ui | ci ∈ C
′} is a size-k hitting set for F .
This completes the proof for M-Multiwinner. It is straightforward to verify that
the same construction yields a parameterized reduction for CC-Multiwinner. Finally,
the W[2]-hardness for the minimax versions follows directly by Observation 1 since the
reduction works for R = 0. Moreover, NP-hardness directly follows since the reduction can
clearly be carried out in polynomial time and containment in NP is obvious.
4.2 The Borda Misrepresentation Function
We refine the reduction from the previous subsection to show that also for the Borda misrep-
resentation function the considered problems are W[2]-hard with respect to the number k of
490
On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
winners as the parameter. However, in contrast to the case of the approval misrepresenta-
tion function the reduction does not hold for the case that R = 0. Hence, we investigate the
parameter total misrepresentation R as well as the composite parameter (R, k) subsequently.
4.2.1 The Number of Winners as Parameter
For the Borda misrepresentation function, we also provide a many-one reduction from
Hitting Set for M-Multiwinner and then argue that the presented reduction works
for the other three problems as well. For CC-Multiwinner W[2]-hardness also directly
follows from the NP-hardness reduction (also from Hitting Set) provided by Lu and
Boutilier (2011, Thm. 8).4 Our reduction, however, can deal with the M-criterion and can
be adopted to the minimax versions of the two rules; in particular, using some padding of
candidates and voters to deal with the M-criterion.
Theorem 2. (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner and (Minimax) M-Multiwinner are W[2]-
hard with respect to the number k of winners for the Borda misrepresentation function.
Minimax CC-Multiwinner and Minimax M-Multiwinner are NP-complete.
Proof. First, we show W[2]-hardness for M-Multiwinner by a parameterized reduction
fromHitting Set. Given an HS-instance (F = {F1, . . . , Fn}, U = {u1, . . . , um}, k) build an
instance of M-Multiwinner as follows. Let z := nmk. The set C of candidates is CU ∪B,
where CU := {cu | u ∈ U} and B := {b
1
i , . . . , b
z
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ nk}. Moreover, the multiset of
voters is VF ∪D, where VF := {vi | Fi ∈ F} and D := {d1, . . . , dn(k−1)}. For each voter his
misrepresentation function is given by his preference list.5
Each of the n “set voters” vi ∈ VF has the following preference list:
{cu | u ∈ Fi} > b
1
i > . . . > b
z
i > {cu | u ∈ U \ Fi} > {b
1
j , . . . , b
z
j | 1 ≤ j ≤ nk, j 6= i}.
Finally, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n(k − 1)}, the voter di from D has the following preference
list:
c1 > c2 > . . . > cm > b
1
n+i > . . . > b
z
n+i > {b
1
j , . . . , b
z
j | 1 ≤ j ≤ nk, j 6= n+ i}.
This completes the construction. For the correctness we show the following.
Claim. There is a size-k hitting set for F if and only if there is a size-k winner
set for M-Multiwinner that represents all voters with total misrepresentation
at most z = nmk.
“⇒”: Let U ′ denote a size-k hitting set for F and C ′ := {cu | u ∈ U
′}. We build a
mapping w : V → C ′ as follows. First, for every Fi ∈ F , set w(vi) := cu for an arbitrarily
chosen element u ∈ Fi∩U
′. Clearly, r(vi, cu) ≤ m since the elements in Fi top the preference
list of vi and |Fi| ≤ m. So far, the n voters from VF are assigned to the candidates from C
′.
4. The proof is provided in the extended version that appeared at the Third International Workshop on
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-10) under the title “Budgeted Social Choice: A Framework for
Multiple Recommendations in Consensus Decision Making”, see Thm. 6.
5. To improve the readability, we also use sets of candidates in the description of preference lists. Such a
set can be fixed in an arbitrary order.
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Since each candidate in C ′ can represent each dummy voter in D with misrepresentation at
most m, one can extend the mapping so that exactly n voters are assigned to each cu ∈ C
′
with misrepresentation at most m for each voter. Thus, the total misrepresentation of this
assignment is at most nm+ nm(k − 1) = nmk.
“⇐”: Let C ′ ⊆ C denote a size-k winner set and w be a mapping from V to C ′ such
that
∑
v∈V r(v,w(v)) ≤ mnk. First, we show that C
′ can contain no candidate bji from B.
Every candidate from B can represent at most one voter with misrepresentation value better
than z. More specifically, if 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then bji can represent only the voter vi with this
quality of representation and if, n < i ≤ nk, then bji can present only the voter di. Since
every candidate from C ′ must be assigned to exactly n voters and the misrepresentation
bound is z, we conclude that C ′ ∩B = ∅.
It remains to show that U ′ := {u ∈ U | cu ∈ C
′} is a hitting set for F . A voter vi ∈
VF can be represented by a candidate cu ∈ CU with misrepresentation at most z only
if u ∈ Fi since all candidates cu′ with u
′ ∈ U \ Fi occur in the preference list of vi after the
candidates b1i , . . . , b
z
i . Thus, U
′ is a hitting set for F of size k.
This completes the proof for M-Multiwinner. The same construction yields a pa-
rameterized reduction for CC-Multiwinner based on the same claim. The direction from
left to right follows in complete analogy. For the other direction, the only difference is
that here a solution set C ′ of the CC-Multiwinner instance might contain a candidate
from B. However, if there is such a candidate bji , then it can represent at most one voter
(that is, vi) within the required misrepresentation bound and hence can be replaced by a
candidate cu ∈ Fi that represents the corresponding voter even better.
For the proof of Minimax M-Multiwinner and Minimax CC-Multiwinner, it fol-
lows directly from the arguments above that there is a size-k hitting set for F if and only
if there is a set of winners for Minimax M/CC-Multiwinner consisting of k candidates
that represent all voters with maximum misrepresentation at most R := m − 1. Hence,
W[2]-hardness as well as NP-hardness follow.
4.2.2 Parameter Misrepresentation Bound
Recall that for the approval misrepresentation function, all four problems are NP-hard even
in the fully personalized setting, that is, when R = 0. In contrast, for CC-MW and M-
MW for the Borda misrepresentation function, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for
every constant R while showing that the minimax versions are NP-hard for R ≥ 1 and
polynomial-time solvable for R = 0. First, by a simple exhaustive search strategy, one
obtains the following.
Theorem 3. For the Borda misrepresentation function, CC-Multiwinner and M-Multi-
winner are solvable in polynomial time when the misrepresentation bound R is constant.
Proof. In every solution, at most R voters can be represented with misrepresentation greater
than 0. Thus, for constant values of R, one can try all O(|V |R) subsets of at most R voters
to find a subset V ′ ⊆ V of voters that are not represented with misrepresentation value
zero by an optimal winner set. For each such subset V ′, for each voter of v ∈ V ′, one
further tries all possible misrepresentation values from 1 to R, that is, one tries O(RR)
possibilities for each V ′. For each such possibility, the “misrepresentation value” of each
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voter is determined. Since for Borda there is exactly one candidate that can represent
a voter with a specific value, this also implies a corresponding mapping of V ′ to a set
of candidates. Every remaining voter is assigned to the candidate which represents him
with misrepresentation value zero. In the case of CC-Multiwinner, it remains to check
whether at most k candidates have become representatives and whether the corresponding
set of candidates can represent all voters with total misrepresentation at most R. In the case
of M-Multiwinner one additionally needs to check whether the corresponding assignment
satisfies the M -criterion. It follows that in both cases an optimal set of k winners can be
computed in O((|V | ·R)R · |V ||C|) time.
Note that Theorem 3 does not imply fixed-parameter tractability with respect to R,
which remains open in this work. However, we provide fixed-parameter tractability results
with respect to the composite parameter (R, k) at the end of this section. Now, we contrast
the results for CC-MW and M-MW by showing that the minimax versions become provably
more difficult. More specifically, we show the following.
Theorem 4. For the Borda misrepresentation function, minimax CC-Multiwinner and
minimax M-Multiwinner are solvable in polynomial time if the total misrepresentation
bound R = 0 and are NP-hard for every R ≥ 1.
Proof. For R = 0 polynomial-time solvability follows directly from the fact that every voter v
must be assigned to a candidate c with r(v, c) = 0 and for the Borda misrepresentation
function there is only one such candidate. Hence, one only needs to check if there are less
than k such candidates and, for minimax M-Multiwinner whether the corresponding
assignment satisfies the M-criterion.
Now, we show NP-hardness for R = 1 by a reduction from a special case of Hitting
Set. More specifically, Hitting Set is NP-hard even if every set consists of two elements
and every element appears in at most three sets (Garey, Johnson, & Stockmeyer, 1974,
Thm. 2.4).6
Given such a restricted HS-instance (F = {F1, . . . , Fn}, U = {u1, . . . , um}, k), build
an election as follows. Identify every set from F with a voter and identify every element
from U with a candidate. Moreover, define the following misrepresentation function. For
each F = {u, v} ∈ F , let the misrepresentation of voter F be zero for the candidate u and
one for the candidate v, and the remaining misrepresentation values are assigned arbitrarily
to the remaining candidates. Then, the following claim is easy to see.
Claim: There is a hitting set of size k if and only if there is a set of k winners
such that the misrepresentation for each voter is at most 1.
This shows the theorem for Minimax CC-MW and R = 1. For Minimax M-MW,
one can use the following observation showing NP-hardness for an even more restricted
setting. It follows directly from the Hitting Set instances constructed in the NP-hardness
proof (Garey et al., 1974, Thm. 2.4) that for a yes-instance there is always a hitting set
such that every element “hits” either two or three sets from F . More specifically, in case
of a yes-instance there is a hitting set U ′ ⊆ U such that every u′ ∈ U ′ can be assigned
6. The problem is Vertex Cover on cubic graphs.
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1 Branch (V ′, R′, C ′) :
2 if R′ < 0 or |C ′| > k then
3 return “no”;
4 if
∑
w∈V ′(mind∈C′ r(w, d)) ≤ R
′ then
5 return “yes”;
6 Consider an arbitrary v ∈ V ′;
7 V ′ := V ′ \ {v};
8 for each c ∈ C with r(v, c) ≤ R′ do
9 R′′ := R′ − r(v, c) ;
10 C ′′ := C ′ ∪ {c};
11 V ′′ := V ′ \ {w ∈ V ′ | r(w, c) = 0};
12 if Branch (V ′′, R′′, C ′′) then
13 return “yes” ;
14
15 end
16 return “no”;
Algorithm 1: Branching strategy for CC-Multiwinner for Borda misrepresentation
functions showing fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the composite parame-
ter (R, k). Initially, the algorithm is invoked with the arguments (V,R, ∅). Moreover, C
and k are provided as global variables.
either to two or three sets from F and every set “is hit” by exactly one element. Such a
hitting set then one-to-one-corresponds to a winner set fulfilling the M-criterion and hence
the theorem also follows for Minimax M-MW and R = 1. For every R > 1, NP-hardness
can be proved by similar arguments. Basically, extend the previous construction as follows.
For every voter, add R − 1 new candidates that are placed at the first R − 1 positions for
this voter and at a position higher than R for every other voter. Since these new candidates
clearly cannot be part of any Minimax M-MW solution with misrepresentation bound R,
one can argue analogously for this case.
4.2.3 Composite Parameter Number of Winners and Misrepresentation
Bound
In this paragraph, we focus on the scenario that one has a small set of winners that can
represent all the voters with small total misrepresentation. This is modeled by the composite
parameter (R, k), where k is the number of winners and R is the total misrepresentation.
We show that for the Borda misrepresentation function, all four considered problems are
fixed-parameter tractable.
Theorem 5. For the Borda misrepresentation function, CC-Multiwinner and Mini-
max CC-Multiwinner are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the composite param-
eter (R, k), where k denotes the number of winners and R the misrepresentation bound.
Proof. First, we provide a branching strategy for Minimax CC-MW. To find a size-k
solution we proceed as follows. For an arbitrary voter v ∈ V , branch according to all
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candidates c with r(v, c) ≤ R. For each possibility, create a subinstance by deleting each
voter w with r(w, c) ≤ R from V and recursively solve the corresponding subinstance
for k − 1. Finally, report whether for at least one subinstance a solution of size k − 1
has been found. The recursion stops either if k < 0 (reporting “no”) or if all voters are
represented (reporting “yes”).
The correctness of the corresponding algorithm is obvious since a voter v must be rep-
resented by a candidate c with r(v, c) ≤ R. Regarding the running time, one branches
into R + 1 possibilities for every considered voter and decreases the value of k by one for
every subinstance. Hence, the algorithm investigates at most (R+ 1)k possibilities.
We show how to extend this branching strategy to work for CC-MW. The branching
recursion is displayed in Algorithm 1 and is invoked with the arguments (V,R, ∅). Note
that C and k are provided as global variables.
The correctness of Algorithm 1 can be seen as follows. The algorithm first checks
whether the misrepresentation bound or the solution size are exceeded (Line 2). Second,
the algorithm checks whether the current candidate set is already a winner set, that is,
whether all voters are represented and the assignment is within the misrepresentation bound
(Line 4). Otherwise, for an arbitrarily chosen voter v (Line 6), the algorithm tries all
possible ways of representation without exceeding the misrepresentation bound (Line 8).
For each possibility, it decreases R′ by the value needed for the representation of v by the
corresponding candidate (Line 9). If this possibility implies that a new candidate is added
to the current solution, then we can clearly assign all voters that are optimally represented
by this candidate to it and hence delete the corresponding voters (Line 11). Finally, we
recursively invoke the Branch procedure for the corresponding subinstance (Line 12). Since
all possibilities to represent v are considered at least one possibility must lead to a solution
(if one exists).
Regarding the running time, we show that before each recursive call (Line 12) the
algorithm decreases R′ or increases |C ′| (or both). In the initial call one has C ′ = ∅ and
hence |C ′| is increased by one (Line 10). For every further call, the only case in which |C ′|
is not increased is that the considered candidate c is already in the current solution set C ′.
In this case, one cannot have r(v, c) = 0 since then v would have been deleted from V ′ at
the point when c has been added to C ′. Hence, r(v, c) > 0 and R′ is decreased (Line 9).
Since the recursion ends when R′ < 0 or |C ′| > k (Line 2), it follows that the recursion
depth is at most R+ k. Moreover, in each recursive call, one branches according to R + 1
possible candidates (Line 8). Hence, the algorithm can be executed in (R+1)R+k ·poly(n,m)
time.
We remark that the results from Theorem 5 also hold for any instance with misrepre-
sentation functions with nonnegative integer values and |{c ∈ C | r(v, c) ≤ R}| ≤ R+ 1 for
every voter v ∈ V . Moreover, fixed-parameter tractability already follows when |{c ∈ C |
r(v, c) ≤ R}| ≤ f(k,R) for any computable function f . In contrast, the branching strategy
for CC-MW from the Theorem 5 cannot be directly transferred to M-MW since due to the
M-criterion one cannot assign a voter to a selected candidate even if it is her best alter-
native. This means that in an analogous approach the parameter could not be “reduced”
and, hence the size of the “search tree” could not be bounded. To show fixed-parameter
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tractability for M-MW we apply a different approach that employ structural observations
based on the M-criterion.
Consider an instance (C, V, r,R, k) of M-MW. Let a zero-candidate be a candidate c ∈ C
with r(v, c) = 0 for at least one voter v ∈ V .
Lemma 1. In a yes-instance of M-Multiwinner with the Borda misrepresentation func-
tion, there can be at most R+ k zero-candidates.
Proof. We apply a proof by contradiction. Assume that there are more than R + k zero-
candidates and there is a size-k winner set representing all voters with total misrepresenta-
tion at most R. For the Borda misrepresentation function, for every voter v there is exactly
one candidate c with r(v, c) = 0. If c is not part of the winner set, then v contributes by at
least one to the total misrepresentation since r(v, c′) ≥ 1 for every c′ ∈ C \ {c}. Since there
are more than R+k zero-candidates, more than R of them are not part of a size-k solution.
For each of them there is a corresponding voter which is represented by an other candidate
of the solution with misrepresentation at least one. Hence, the total misrepresentation is
more than R; a contradiction.
To make use of the bounded number of zero-candidates, we provide another observation
that exploits the M-criterion of a solution.
Lemma 2. Consider an M-Multiwinner instance with the Borda misrepresentation func-
tion. If the number n of voters is greater than (R + 1)k, then every size-k set of winners
consists of zero-candidates.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there are more than (R+1)k voters and a candidate c
in the solution set does not represent any of the voters with misrepresentation value zero.
Due to the M-criterion and since there are more than (R + 1)k voters, c must represent at
least ((R + 1)k)/k = R + 1 voters with misrepresentation value at least one, respectively.
Since the bound for the total misrepresentation is R, c cannot be part of a solution.
Based on the two previous lemmas, we show the following.
Theorem 6. For the Borda misrepresentation function, the M-Multiwinner problem is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the composite parameter (R, k) where k denotes the
number of winners and R the misrepresentation bound.
Proof. An algorithm can be described by distinguishing two cases: n ≤ (R + 1)k and
n > (R + 1)k. If the former, then fixed-parameter tractability follows from Proposi-
tion 1 (showing fixed-parameter tractability w.r.t. the number of voters). If the latter,
in a yes-instance, by Lemma 1 there are at most R + k zero-candidates and by Lemma 2
the solution has to consist of zero-candidates. After removing all but the zero-candidates,
fixed-parameter tractability follows from Proposition 2 (showing fixed-parameter tractabil-
ity w.r.t. the number of candidates).
Regarding the running time, the first case leads to a running time of ((R+ 1)k)(R+1)k ·
poly(n,m) while the second case can be accomplished in 2R+k ·poly(n,m) time. Hence, the
theorem follows.
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Finally, we show fixed-parameter tractability with respect to (R, k) for Minimax M-
MW with the Borda misrepresentation function. The corresponding algorithm is based on
the same case distinction as the algorithm for M-MW (Theorem 7). While the basic idea of
bounding the number of zero-candidates cannot be transferred from M-MW to Minimax
M-MW, the following algorithm for Minimax M-MW works also for M-MW but leads to
a worse running time bound for the case that the number of voters exceeds (R+1)k. More
specifically, for the case n > (R+1)k, the exponential running time part is 4(R+1)k instead
of 2R+k.
Theorem 7. For the Borda misrepresentation function, Minimax M-Multiwinner is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to (R, k).
Proof. Consider a Minimax M-MW instance (C, V, r,R, k) with r being a Borda misrepre-
sentation function. Because the case R = 0 is trivial for Minimax M-MW with the Borda
misrepresentation function, we assume that R ≥ 1 in the following.
In the case that n ≤ (R + 1)k, fixed-parameter tractability follows from Proposition 1
(analogously to the proof of Theorem 6). Hence, we consider the case that n > (R + 1)k.
Let C := {c1, . . . , cm} and Ei := {v ∈ V | r(v, ci) ≤ R} for every ci ∈ C. Moreover,
let C ′ := {ci ∈ C : |Ei| ≥ ⌊n/k⌋}. We show that, first, every solution has to consist
of candidates from C ′ and, second, |C ′| ≤ 2(R + 1)k. Then, after removing all but the
candidates in C ′, fixed-parameter tractability follows from Proposition 2.
First, due to the M-criterion at least ⌊n/k⌋ voters are assigned to every winning candi-
date in a solution and hence a candidate ci with |Ei| < ⌊n/k⌋ cannot be part of a winner
set.
Second, assume toward a contradiction that |C ′| > 2(R + 1)k. Note that for Borda
misrepresentation functions every voter occurs in at most R + 1 sets from E1, . . . , Em.
Moreover, since |Ei| ≥ ⌊n/k⌋ for every ci ∈ C
′
n > 2(R+ 1)k · ⌊n/k⌋ · 1/(R + 1) > 2k(n/k − 1) = 2n− 2k.
Since in the considered case n > (R + 1)k ≥ 2k, this is a contradiction.
Finally, based on Proposition 2, for the case that n > (R + 1)k, one obtains a running
time bound of 4(R+1)k · poly(n,m).
5. Single-Peaked Elections
As discussed in the introduction (Subsection 1.4), single-peakedness is a central notion in
political science reflecting elections where a single issue dominates preferences of all voters.
Let us now formally define this property.
Definition 5. Let V be a profile over a set of candidates C, and let ⊐ be a linear order over
C (the societal axis). We say that an order v ∈ V is compatible with ⊐ if for all c, d, e ∈ C
such that either c ⊐ d ⊐ e or e ⊐ d ⊐ c it holds that
posv(c) < posv(d) =⇒ posv(d) < posv(e). (1)
(We remind the reader that positions are counted from the top so that, if a is higher in a
linear order than b, then the position of a is lower.) We say that V is single-peaked with
497
Betzler, Slinko, & Uhlmann
+
+
+
+
−
−
×
×
×
×
0
1
2
3
c1 c2 c3 c4
0
1
2
3
c1 c2 c3 c4
+
+
+
+×
×
×
×−
−
Figure 1: An election consists of three voters with the following preferences: c1 > c2 >
c3 > c4, c2 > c3 > c4 > c1, and c3 > c2 > c1 > c4. Its single-peakedness is
witnessed by the societal order c1 ⊐ c2 ⊐ c3 ⊐ c4. The diagram on the left-hand
side shows, for every voter, the Borda score that each alternative gets from this
voter marked by the solid line, dashed line and dotted line, respectively. Note
that every “preference order” has one local maximum. If the voters express their
Borda misrepresentations values instead, then one obtains the diagram on the
right. Here, the misrepresentation function for an arbitrary fixed voter has one
local minimum.
respect to ⊐ if for each i = 1, . . . , n the order vi is compatible with ⊐. A profile V is called
single-peaked if there exists a linear order ⊐ over C such that V is single-peaked with respect
to ⊐; we will say that ⊐ witnesses the single-peakedness of V and refer to ⊐ as societal
order.
Proposition 3. Let V be a single-peaked profile over a set of candidates C witnessed by
the societal order ⊐. Let r be a misrepresentation function for V . Then for every triple
{ci, cj , ck} ⊆ C with ci ⊐ cj ⊐ ck or ck ⊐ cj ⊐ ci and for every v ∈ V
r(v, ci) < r(v, cj) =⇒ r(v, cj) ≤ r(v, ck).
Proof. By the definition of misrepresentation function (see Definition 1) r(v, ci) < r(v, cj)
implies posv(ci) < posv(cj). Now the result follows by (1) and again Definition 1.
In this section, we investigate the computational complexity of determining proportional
representations using Chamberlin and Courant and Monroe methods together with their
variants, when the input profile is single-peaked. As discussed in the introduction, when
the input profile is single-peaked all voters can be viewed as located on a certain axis where
their location is their bliss point. Their most preferred candidate will be either the one
closest on the right or the one closest on the left. Without loss of generality we may assume
that for each voter her bliss point is the location of one of the candidates (who is then most
preferred by her).
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It is clear that the misrepresentation function r(v, c) for a single-peaked profile must
satisfy the following. If we fix the voter v and change c from one end of the societal axis to
the other the value r(v, c) should decrease monotonically to v’s most preferred candidate
at the bliss point and then increase again monotonically for all candidates beyond the bliss
point. That is, for each voter the function expressing the voter’s misrepresentation by
candidates is single-troughed (that is, has exactly one local minimum) with respect to the
order that witnesses single-peakedness of the profile.
Before describing our results, we briefly outline the typical shapes of some prominent
misrepresentation functions in single-peaked settings. The Borda misrepresentation func-
tion is strictly ascending when moving away from the local minimum in both directions.
Moreover, if from the candidate preceding the candidate at the local minimum the misrep-
resentation function drops by d > 0 points, then, for the next d− 1 candidates on the other
side of the local minimum, the misrepresentation function must ascend in size-one steps.
In contrast, for the approval misrepresentation function, there is exactly one interval of
consecutive candidates on the societal axis for whom the misrepresentation is zero while for
all remaining candidates outside the interval the misrepresentation is one. For the minimax
variants one obtains a similar structure, in the sense that there can be only one interval in
which a particular voter can be represented without exceeding the given misrepresentation
bound. Note that there is some remote similarity here between the last two cases and
preferences over intervals in the aggregating range values model introduced by Farfel and
Conitzer (2011).
In the remainder of this section, we provide the following results summarized on Ta-
ble 2. We show that CC-Multiwinner, Minimax CC-Multiwinner, and Minimax M-
Multiwinner for single-peaked elections can be solved in polynomial time for an arbitrary
misrepresentation function (Theorem 8, Proposition 4, and Proposition 5, respectively). In
contrast to the three aforementioned problems, we present a reduction from an NP-hard ver-
sion of the Exact 3-Cover problem which shows that M-Multiwinner is NP-hard even
when restricted to single-peaked profiles (Theorem 11). However, for the approval misrep-
resentation function, we still obtain polynomial-time solvability for M-Multiwinner and
single-peaked input profiles (Theorem 10). We leave open the computational complexity
for M-Multiwinner for the Borda misrepresentation function in the single-peaked case.
5.1 (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner
We show that on single-peaked input profilesCC-Multiwinner andMinimax CC-Multi-
winner are polynomial-time solvable for an arbitrary misrepresentation function. We first
provide a dynamic programming algorithm for the case of CC-Multiwinner. Second, we
argue that Minimax CC-Multiwinner can be solved optimally by a greedy algorithm.
5.1.1 A Dynamic Programming Procedure for CC-Multiwinner
For CC-Multiwinner the polynomial-time solvability is established by presenting a dy-
namic programming algorithm leading to the following.
Theorem 8. For a single-peaked input profile and an arbitrary misrepresentation function
CC-Multiwinner can be solved in O(nm2) time.
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1 Function SinglePeaked-CC-MW(V , C, r, k) Input: A multiset of
voters V := {v1, . . . , vn}, a set of candidates C := {c1, . . . , cm}, a
misrepresentation function r, and a positive integer k. The voters have
single-peaked preferences according to the societal order ⊐, where
c1 ⊐ c2 ⊐ . . . ⊐ cm.
Output: The minimum total misrepresentation for k winners.
2 begin
3 for i = 1, . . . ,m do
4 z(i, 1) :=
∑
v∈V r(v, ci);
5 end
6 for p = 1, . . . ,m do
7 for i = p+ 1, . . . ,m do
8 d(p, i) :=
∑
v∈V max{0, r(v, cp)− r(v, ci)};
9 end
10 end
11 for i = 2, . . . ,m do
12 for j = 2, . . . ,min(k, i) do
13 z(i, j) := minp∈{j−1,...,i−1} (z(p, j − 1)− d(p, i));
14 end
15 end
16 return mini∈{k,...,m}(z(i, k));
17 end
Algorithm 2: Dynamic programming algorithm for CC-Multiwinner for single-peaked
input profiles.
Proof. Throughout the proof we assume that the voters have single-peaked preferences
according to the societal order ⊐, where c1 ⊐ c2 ⊐ . . . ⊐ cm. For a set C
′ ⊆ C, the
minimum total misrepresentation is defined as
s(C ′) =
∑
v∈V
min
c′∈C′
{r(v, c′)}.
We define a dynamic programming table z, containing an entry z(i, j) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
and all 1 ≤ j ≤ min(i, k). Informally speaking, the entry z(i, j) gives the minimum total
misrepresentation for a set of j winners from {c1, . . . , ci} including ci.
The dynamic programming procedure SinglePeaked-CC-MW is provided in Algorithm 2.
We show that it solves CC-Multiwinner in the claimed running time. Regarding the
correctness, we will show that after the execution of SinglePeaked-CC-MW the following
equation is satisfied
z(i, j) = min
(
s(C ′) | C ′ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci} ∧ |C
′| = j ∧ ci ∈ C
′
)
. (2)
Then, the minimum total misrepresentation of an optimal size-k winner set is clearly given
by mini∈{k,...,m} z(i, k) (see Line 16).
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The proof of Equation 2 follows by induction on j. First, we argue that the entries z(i, 1)
satisfy Equation (2), yielding the base for induction. To this end, observe that if there is
only one candidate ci in the winner set, then all voters must be assigned to ci, yielding the
misrepresentation sum s({ci}) =
∑
v∈V r(v, ci), see Line 4.
Next, we show that an entry z(i, j) with j > 1 (as computed in Line 13) complies with
Equation (2) provided that z(p, j−1) does for all 1 ≤ p < i. Consider a set C∗ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci}
with ci ∈ C
∗ and |C∗| = j such that s(C∗) is minimum among all such sets. We argue
that z(i, j) = s(C∗). Let p < i such that cp ∈ C
∗ and cℓ 6∈ C
∗ for all p < ℓ < i.
This implies that p ≥ j − 1. The crucial observation is as follows. If for a voter v it
holds that r(v, ci) < r(v, cp), then the single-peakedness implies that r(v, cq) ≥ r(v, cp) >
r(v, ci) for all q < p. Hence, if we consider a set C
′′ of j − 1 candidates from {c1, . . . , cp}
with cp ∈ C
′′, then we can assume that the value r(v, cp) is the contribution of voter v to
the total misrepresentation s(C ′′). Hence, by adding ci to C
′′ there is an improvement of
r(v, cp) − r(v, ci) for each voter v with r(v, cp) > r(v, ci). For every remaining voter v, it
holds that r(v, ci) ≥ r(v, cp) and hence one cannot improve the representation by assigning
him to ci. It follows that s(C
∗) = s(C ′′)−
∑
v∈V max{0, r(v, cp)− r(v, ci)} = s(C
′′)−d(p, i)
and by the induction assumption we have z(p, j − 1) = s(C ′′). Finally, since the algorithm
tries all possible choices of p (see Line 13) we have that z(i, j) = s(C∗).
It is straightforward to verify that the running time of Algorithm 2 is O(nm2).
5.1.2 A Greedy Algorithm for Minimax CC-Multiwinner
For single-peaked input profiles, the minimax version of CC-Multiwinner can be solved
by a simple greedy algorithm. The basic idea is to iterate over the candidates according to
the societal order and to put into the solution the first candidate for whom there is a voter
that cannot be represented by the previously selected candidates. The correctness is based
on the observation that for each candidate there is a “representation range” (or interval) of
consecutive candidates in which the voter must be represented. Thus, we can choose the
latest possible candidate that can represent the voter with the representation range that
ends first since this candidate is at least as good as every previous candidate.
In other words, the basic combinatorial problem is to cover or stab a given set of intervals
(corresponding to the representation ranges of the voters) by k points (corresponding to
the candidates). This stabbing problem in turn corresponds to a clique cover problem in
interval graphs and can be solved in linear time (Golumbic, 1980). In the next section, we
investigate the relationships between the considered voting problems and special (rectangle)
stabbing problems in more detail. Here, we conclude with the following.
Proposition 4. For a single-peaked input profile and an arbitrary misrepresentation func-
tion Minimax-CC-Multiwinner can be solved in O(nm) time.
5.2 (Minimax) M-Multiwinner
We focus on the case when the assignment of the candidates to the winner set satisfies the
M-criterion, that is, it is required that each winner represents about the same number of
candidates. This additional constraint makes the winner determination more involved. In-
deed, we can show that for an integer-valued misrepresentation function M-Multiwinner
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is NP-hard even if the input profile is single-peaked. On the positive side, we show that M-
Multiwinner for single-peaked input profiles and the approval misrepresentation function
and Minimax M-Multiwinner for arbitrary misrepresentation functions are polynomial-
time solvable. However, the solving strategies (that are also based on dynamic program-
ming) are more intricate than for (Minimax) CC-Multiwinner. For proving polynomial-
time solvability we establish a close relationship to the so-called 1-dimensional Rectan-
gle Stabbing (Even et al., 2008). We start with the polynomial-time algorithms followed
by the NP-hardness proof. The computational complexity for M-Multiwinner for the
Borda misrepresentation function for single-peaked input profiles is left open.
5.2.1 M-Multiwinner for Approval and Minimax M-Multiwinner
We use the notation of Even et al. (2008) whenever possible. The input consists of a set U of
horizontal intervals and a set S of vertical lines with capacity c(S) ∈ {0, . . . , |U|} for every
line S ∈ S. Informally, the task is to cover (or stab) all intervals by a minimum number of
vertical lines from S, where each line S covers at most c(S) intervals (a vertical line covers
a horizontal interval iff they intersect). Since a line S ∈ S can cover at most c(S) intervals,
one has to specify which interval is assigned to which line in the solution. Let U(S) denote
the set of intervals from U intersecting with S ∈ S. An assignment is a function A : S → 2U ,
where A(S) ⊆ U(S). A set S ′ ⊆ S is a cover if there is an assignment A with |A(S)| ≤ c(S)
for all S ∈ S ′ and
⋃
S∈S′ A(S) = U .
One-Dimensional Rectangle Stabbing with Hard Constraints (Hard-
1-RS):
Input: A set U of horizontal intervals and a set S of vertical lines with capaci-
ties c(S) ∈ {0, . . . , |U|} for every line S ∈ S.
Task: Find a minimum-cardinality cover S ′ ⊆ S (and the corresponding assign-
ment).
Now, consider a single-peaked instance of M-Multiwinner with R = 0 in which every
winner represents exactly the same number of voters, that is, n mod k = 0 for n voters
and k winners. In this case, the problem can be “reduced” to Hard-1-RS as follows. For
every candidate there is a vertical line according to its position on the societal axis. Since
each voter v must be represented by a candidate c with r(v, c) = 0 and all the candidates
with r(v, c) = 0 are ordered consecutively on the societal axis, we can represent each voter
by a horizontal interval reaching from the leftmost candidate c with r(v, c) = 0 to the
rightmost such candidate. Finally, each vertical line is associated with a capacity of n/k,
which is a whole number. Clearly, there is a solution for the M-Multiwinner instance
with R = 0 if and only if there is a size-k cover for the constructed instance of Hard-1-RS.
Note that for the case, when n mod k 6= 0, this transformation cannot be applied since
one does not know whether a candidate line has “capacity” ⌈n/k⌉ or ⌊n/k⌋ in an optimal
solution.
Even et al. (2008) presented a dynamic programming algorithm for Hard-1-RS with
running time O(|U|2 · |S|2 · (|U| + |S|)). Since the transformation described above can be
easily accomplished in linear time, one directly obtains the following.
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Corollary 1. An instance of M-Multiwinner with a single-peaked profile such that n mod
k = 0, and R = 0 (and an arbitrary misrepresentation function) can be solved in O(n2m2(n+
m)) time.
We show that for single-peaked input profiles, M-Multiwinner for the approval mis-
representation function (and arbitrary misrepresentation bound R) can be solved in poly-
nomial time. To this end, we show that these instances can be reduced to a version of
one-dimensional rectangle stabbing where the goal is to stab a maximum number of hori-
zontal intervals with k vertical lines. More specifically, we introduce the following problem
which to the best of our knowledge has not been studied before.
Maximum Balanced One-Dimensional Rectangle Stabbing (Max-Bal-
1-RS):
Input: Amulti-set U = {u1, . . . , un} of horizontal intervals, a set S = {S1, . . . , Sm}
of vertical lines, and a positive integer k.
Task: Find a size-k set S ′ ⊆ S and an assignment A such that each of the
following statements hold.
• |
⋃
S∈S′ A(S)| is maximum,
• for every S ∈ S ′, |A(S)| ≤ ⌈n/k⌉, and
• |{S ∈ S ′ : |A(S)| = ⌈n/k⌉}| ≤ n mod k, where n mod k is the remainder
on division of n by k.
The last two restrictions in the problem description can be considered as saying that we
have kc = n mod k lines with capacity ⌈n/k⌉ and kf = k−kc lines with capacity ⌊n/k⌋, not
specifying which line has which capacity, while for Hard-1-RS there is a specific capacity
for every line. The other difference between Max-Bal-1-RS and Hard-1-RS is that in the
latter all intervals must be covered by a minimum number of lines whereas in the former
the goal is to cover a maximum number of intervals with k lines.
We show that the dynamic programming algorithm of Even et al. (2008) for Hard-1-RS
can be adapted to work forMax-Bal-1-RS. To this end, we employ the same decomposition
property (stated in Observation 3 below) but the dynamic programming table and the
algorithm will be different.
We introduce the following notation to state the dynamic programming. For an inter-
val u ∈ U , let l(u) denote the left endpoint of u and r(u) denote the right endpoint of u
(that is, l(u) ≤ r(u)). Let x(S) denote the coordinate of line S ∈ S and S(x) denote the
vertical line associated with a coordinate x. For two integers s and t let [s, t] denote the set
of all integers i with s ≤ i ≤ t.
For ease of presentation, we assume that the input has the following “normalized” form
that can easily be established. First, we assume that all endpoints of the intervals and the
coordinates of all lines are integers. Second, we assume that {x(S) | S ∈ S} = [1,m]. Third,
we assume that the endpoints of all intervals are from [1,m]. In what follows, we do not
distinguish between a line S ∈ S and its coordinate x(S), that is, we identify the lines in S by
the elements of [1,m] (and vice versa). Finally, we assume that the intervals u1, u2, . . . , un
are ordered so that l(u1) ≤ l(u2) ≤ . . . ≤ l(un) (we fix one such ordering).
The algorithm makes use of the fact that there is always an optimal solution that satisfies
the “leftmost interval first property” defined as follows (Even et al., 2008).
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Definition 6. Let S ′ ⊆ S denote a size-k set of lines and let A denote an assignment. We
say that (S ′, A) has the leftmost interval first property if the following holds. Let S ∈ S ′
and let ui ∈ A(S). For every S
′ ∈ S ′ with l(ui) ≤ S
′ < S and for every uj with uj ∈ A(S
′),
either j < i or r(uj) < S.
Note that the leftmost interval first property is defined with respect to the fixed ordering
of the intervals. Any solution can be transformed into an “equivalent” one satisfying the
leftmost interval first property by simply swapping the assignments of “conflicting” interval
pairs, (see, e.g., Even et al., 2008). Hence, there is always an optimal solution satisfying the
leftmost interval first property and one can apply a dynamic programming procedure based
on the following decomposition, analogously to the work of Even et al. (2008, Section 2).
Observation 3. Let (S ′, A) be an optimal solution of Max-Bal-1-RS that satisfies the
leftmost interval first property. For any range [x1, x2] ⊆ [1,m], let ui ∈ U be the earliest
interval among the intervals covered by a line from [x1, x2] (that is, for any uj covered by
lines in this range we have j > i). If ui is covered by line S ∈ [x1, x2] \ {x1}, then the right
endpoint of all intervals covered by lines in the range [x1, S − 1] are to the left of S.
Basically, Observation 3 is used in the algorithm in the following way. Consider the
range [x1,m] and assume that x1 is the leftmost line of the considered solution. Moreover,
assume that ui is the earliest interval that is covered by a line S from [x1,m]. Then, every
interval uj with j < i will not be covered by the solution, every interval uℓ with ℓ > i
and r(uℓ) < S can only be covered by lines from [x1, S − 1], and every interval ur with
S ≤ r(ur) can only be covered by lines from [S,m]. This implies a decomposition of the
instance into two subinstances. The “left” instance contains the intervals ug with g > i
and r(ug) < S and the “right” instance contains the intervals ud with S ≤ r(ud) ≤ m.
Theorem 9. Maximum Balanced One-Dimensional Rectangle Stabbing can be
solved in O(m3n3k3) time.
Proof. We use the following definitions to state the dynamic programming algorithm. Let
kc := n mod k and kf := k − kc. For ui ∈ U and for any two coordinates x1 ≤ x2 such
that r(ui) ∈ [x1, x2], let
U(ui, x1, x2) := {uj ∈ U | j ≥ i ∧ r(uj) ∈ [x1, x2]}.
Note that ui ∈ U(ui, x1, x2) and U = U(u1, 1,m).
The algorithm maintains a dynamic programming table with an entry
Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b) ∈ N
defined for every ui ∈ U , for any two coordinates x1 ≤ x2 such that r(ui) ∈ [x1, x2]
and x1 ∈ ui, for each 0 ≤ k
′
c ≤ kc and for each 0 ≤ k
′
f ≤ kf with k
′
f + k
′
c ≤ k − 1
and |[x1, x2]| ≥ k
′
c+k
′
f +1, and for each 1 ≤ b ≤ ⌈n/k⌉. Informally, the table entry contains
the maximum number of intervals from U(ui, x1, x2) that can be covered by k
′
c+k
′
f +1 lines
from [x1, x2] under the assumption that x1 is contained in the solution and covers at most b
intervals, ui is covered by a line from [x1, x2], and at most k
′
c solution lines different from
x1 are assigned to ⌈n/k⌉ intervals. (Formally, the k
′
c+ k
′
f +1 solution lines must satisfy the
conditions (C1) to (C6).)
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Next, we define subsets of intervals needed for the decomposition into left and right
subinstances. For ui ∈ U , two coordinates 1 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ m such that r(ui) ∈ [x1, x2],
and x ∈ [x1, x2] let
Ul(ui, x, x1, x2) :=
{
∅, if x = x1
{uj ∈ U | j > i ∧ r(uj) ∈ [x1, x− 1]}, otherwise
and
Ur(ui, x, x1, x2) := U(ui, x1, x2) \ (Ul(ui, x, x1, x2) ∪ {ui}).
Algorithm. We state the algorithm which will be explained when discussing the correctness
below. Basically, the algorithm works in three phases. In a first phase, the dynamic
programming table is initialized as follows. For each ui ∈ U , for every two coordinates x1 ≤
x2 such that r(ui) ∈ [x1, x2], x1 ∈ ui, and for every integer b ∈ [1, ⌈n/k⌉], let
Π(ui, x1, x2, 0, 0, b) := min(b, |{u ∈ U(ui, x1, x2) : x1 ∈ u}|). (3)
In a second phase, the table is updated. The update of a table entry Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b)
is provided by Algorithm 3, where the order in which the update is invoked is determined
by Algorithm 4. In a third phase, the algorithm outputs the maximum value over all ui ∈ U
and all x1 ∈ [1, . . . ,m] with x1 ∈ ui and |[x1,m]| ≥ k of
max
{
Π(ui, x1,m, kc − 1, kf , ⌈n/k⌉)
Π(ui, x1,m, kc, kf − 1, ⌊n/k⌋).
(4)
Correctness. We show that in every stage of the dynamic programming an entry contains
the value of a “best” assignment of a partial solution for the subinstance with interval set
U(ui, x1, x2) such that six conditions (C1) to (C6) hold. More specifically, we argue that
for every ui ∈ U , for any two coordinates x1 ≤ x2 such that r(ui) ∈ [x1, x2] and x1 ∈ ui, for
each 0 ≤ k′c ≤ kc and for each 0 ≤ k
′
f ≤ kf with k
′
f + k
′
c ≤ k− 1 and |[x1, x2]| ≥ k
′
c+ k
′
f +1,
and for each 1 ≤ b ≤ ⌈n/k⌉
Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b) = max |
⋃
S′∈S′
A(S′)|
over all sets S ′ ⊆ [x1, x2] and assignments A : S
′ → 2U(ui,x1,x2) with
• there is an S ∈ S ′ with ui ∈ A(S), (C1)
• |S ′| = k′c + k
′
f + 1 , (C2)
• x1 ∈ S
′, (C3)
• |A(x1)| ≤ b, (C4)
• ∀S′∈S′ |A(S
′)| ≤ ⌈n/k⌉, and (C5)
• |{S′ ∈ S ′ \ {x1} : |A(S
′)| = ⌈n/k⌉}| ≤ k′c. (C6)
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1 Function UpdateΠ(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b) begin
2 M := 0;
3 if b > 1 then
4 for every uj ∈ U(ui, x1, x2) \ {ui} with x1 ∈ uj do
5 M := max{M,Π(uj , x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b− 1)};
6 end
7 else
8 for every x′ = x1 + 1 to x2 with |[x
′, x2]| ≥ k
′
c + k
′
f do
9 for every uj ∈ U(ui, x1, x2) \ {ui} with x
′ ∈ uj do
10 if k′c > 0 then
11 M := max{M,Π(uj , x
′, x2, k
′
c − 1, k
′
f , ⌈n/k⌉)};
12 if k′f > 0 then
13 M := max{M,Π(uj , x
′, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f − 1, ⌊n/k⌋)};
14
15 end
16 end
17 for every x = x1 + 1 to r(ui) with x ∈ ui do
18 for all klc ≥ 0 and k
r
c ≥ 0 with k
l
c + k
r
c = k
′
c do
19 for all klf ≥ 0 and k
r
f ≥ 0 with k
l
f + k
r
f = k
′
f do
20 if |[x1, x− 1]| ≥ k
l
c + k
l
f + 1 and |[x, x2]| ≥ k
r
c + k
r
f then
21 Ml,Mr := 0;
22 for every uj ∈ Ul(ui, x, x1, x2) with x1 ∈ uj do
23 Ml := max{Ml,Π(uj , x1, x− 1, k
l
c, k
l
f , b)};
24 end
25 for every uj ∈ Ur(ui, x, x1, x2) with x ∈ uj do
26 if krc > 0 then
27 Mr := max{Mr,Π(uj , x, x2, k
r
c − 1, k
r
f , ⌈n/k⌉ − 1)};
28 if krf > 0 then
29 Mr := max{Mr,Π(uj , x, x2, k
r
c , k
r
f − 1, ⌊n/k⌋ − 1)};
30
31 end
32 M := max{M,Ml +Mr};
33 end
34 end
35 end
36 end
37 Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b) :=M + 1;
38 end
Algorithm 3: Update step employed by the dynamic programming algorithm for Max-
Bal-1-RS presented in the proof of Theorem 9.
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1 Main :
2 for all [x1, x2] ⊆ [1,m] in increasing order of x2 − x1 do
3 for k′c = 0, . . . , kc do
4 for k′f = 0, . . . , kf do
5 if |[x1, x2]| ≥ k
′
c + k
′
f + 1 and 1 ≤ k
′
c + k
′
f ≤ k − 1 then
6 for b = 1, . . . , ⌈n/k⌉ do
7 for ui ∈ U with r(ui) ∈ [x1, x2] and x1 ∈ ui do
8 Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b) := UpdateΠ(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b);
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 end
Algorithm 4: Main loop after the initialization.
For every entry computed in the initialization step (Equation 3), the algorithm stores the
maximum value of a “partial solution” S ′ = {x1} (satisfies (C2) and (C3)), that covers ui
(C1) (which is possible since x1 ∈ ui and b ≥ 1), and that satisfies |A(x1)| ≤ b (C4). Clearly,
(C5) and (C6) hold as well.
Regarding the update step (see Algorithm 3), let us assume that the values of all entries
that are accessed in the update are correct and well-defined (discussed below). To en-
sure (C1) for an entry Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b), interval ui must be covered by one of the lines
of [x1, x2]. We argue that all such possibilities that hold the conditions C1 - C6 are con-
sidered systematically and the current maximum value is stored in the variable M . Before
going into further details, we observe that Algorithm 3 adds one to the overall maximum
value (Line 37) to take into account that ui has been “newly” covered. This is correct
because there is at least one possibility to cover ui in the considered interval, namely, x1
can always cover u1 since x1 ∈ ui (Line 7 of Algorithm 4) and b ≥ 1 (Line 6 of Algorithm 4).
Lines 3 to 16 of Algorithm 3 consider the possibility that x1 is used to cover ui. Here,
two possibilities are distinguished. The first investigated possibility (Line 3 to Line 7 of
Algorithm 3) is that ui is covered by x1 and x1 can cover at least one more interval, that
is, b > 1. In this case, we can compute the optimal value based on the value for the
subinstance not containing ui and in which x1 is in the solution but can be assigned to
one interval less. To this end, b is decreased by one (that is, (C4) holds) and all possible
intervals in U(ui, x1, x2) \ {ui} (Line 4) are checked to be the leftmost covered interval in
a corresponding subsolution. Moreover, since k′f and k
′
c remain the same and we assume
that conditions (C2), (C5), and (C6) hold for Π(uj , x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b − 1), they also hold for
Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b).
The second investigated possibility (Lines 7 to 16 of Algorithm 3) is that ui is covered
by x1 and x1 can cover at most one interval, that is, b = 1. This case can be traced back
to the same subinstance without ui and x1. To access the corresponding possibilities in the
dynamic programming table, Algorithm 3 tries all possible lines to be new solution lines
(Line 8) and “leftmost” intervals to be covered in the new subinstance (Line 9). Then, it
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chooses the maximum of assigning a “capacity” of ⌈n/k⌉ (Line 11) or ⌊n/k⌋ (Line 13) to
x′. Note that since 1 ≤ k′c+ k
′
f (Line 5 of Algorithm 4) at least one of these two cases must
be possible (if there is at least one further interval to be covered, that is, U(ui, x1, x2) \
{ui} 6= ∅). Assume that we have a solution corresponding to a table entry Π(uj , x
′, x2, k
′
c −
1, k′f , ⌈n/k⌉)} (Line 11) or Π(uj , x
′, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f −1, ⌊n/k⌋)} (Line 13), respectively, and hence,
fulfilling the conditions (C1) to (C6) for the corresponding subinstance. Then, clearly
adding x1 to this solution and assigning ui to x1 gives a solution fulfilling all constraints
for Π(ui, x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b) for b = 1.
The following loop of Algorithm 3 (Lines 17 to 37) tries all possibilities to cover ui
by a line x 6= x1. If x 6= x1, according to Observation 3, the instance can be divided
into two subinstances. All combinations of sizes of the subsolutions are tested by iterating
over klc, k
r
c , k
l
f , and k
r
f (Lines 18 and 19). In Lines 22 to 23 Algorithm 3 computes an
optimal solution for the “left” subinstance and in Lines 25 to 29 it computes a solution
for the right subinstance obtained after assigning ui to x. The decomposition into the
subinstances defined by the interval sets Ur(ui, x, x1, x2) and Ul(ui, x, x1, x2) follows directly
from Observation 3. Moreover, since x1 is part of the left subinstance with unchanged
“capacity bound” b, conditions (C1), (C3) and (C4) hold. It remains to show that (C2),
(C5) and (C6) hold, that is, in addition to x1 a considered subsolution consists of k
′
c lines
that are assigned to at most ⌈n/k⌉ intervals and k′f lines that are assigned to at most ⌊n/k⌋
intervals. In any considered possibility, only x is newly specified as a solution line and
according to the decomposition (see Observation 3 and the definitions of Ul,Ur) it is part of
the right subinstance. In Lines 27 and 29, Algorithm 3 chooses the maximum between the
possibilities that x can be assigned to at most ⌈n/k⌉ or ⌊n/k⌋ intervals, respectively, and
adapts the values or krc and k
r
f accordingly when accessing the corresponding table entries.
Hence, all conditions hold.
Now, consider the output of the overall algorithm, see Equation (4). The first maximum
function iterates over all intervals ui and possible leftmost solution lines and hence will find a
pair ui and x1 as follows. The interval ui is the leftmost interval that is covered by a solution
with leftmost interval first property and x1 is the leftmost line of the considered solution.
Then, the second maximum function chooses the maximum of the two cases that x1 is
assigned to at most ⌈n/k⌉ or ⌊n/k⌋ intervals, respectively. Since (C1) to (C6) hold for the
corresponding entries, the algorithm outputs the maximum |
⋃
S∈S′ A(S)| overall S
′ ⊆ [1,m]
and corresponding assignments A fulfilling the further constraints of the definition of Max-
Bal-1RS.
It remains to show that the algorithm only accesses well-defined entries, that is, the
accessed entries have been computed before. This is ensured by iterating over the dy-
namic programming table as described in Algorithm 4. Regarding the computation of
Π(uj , x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b − 1) in Line 5 of Algorithm 3, all parameters values except b are the
same as in the current entry. In Line 6 Algorithm 4 iterates over b in increasing order
and, hence, Π(uj , x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b − 1) has been computed before it is accessed. Moreover,
the condition b > 1 in Line 3 of Algorithm 3 ensures that Π(uj , x1, x2, k
′
c, k
′
f , b − 1) is well
defined. In Lines 11 and 13 of Algorithm 3, the accessed range [x′, x2] is smaller than the
range from x1 to x2. Since the algorithm iterates over ranges according to increasing size
(Line 2 in Algorithm 4) and the other parameter values have also been considered in former
iteration loops, the entry has been computed before. In Line 23 of Algorithm 3 the accessed
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entry has a “range” from x1 to x− 1 < x2 in Lines 27, and 29 the considered range [x, x2]
is also strictly smaller than the range [x1, x2]. Again, according to Line 2 in Algorithm 4),
the entries have been computed before.
Running time. Regarding the running time, the update can be accomplished in O(mk2n)
time (see Algorithm 3) by iterating over at most m coordinates of the lines in S (Line 17),
less than k2 cases in Lines 18 and 19, and less than n intervals in the inner loops in
Lines 5, 22, and 25, respectively. The overall loop (Algorithm 4) gives an additional factor
of O(m2n2k): By an appropriate implementation it can be accomplished by iterating over
less than m2 coordinate ranges (Line 2), less than k2 possibilities in Lines 4 and 3, ⌈n/k⌉ ≤
(n + 1)/k values of b (Line 6), and at most n intervals in Line 7. This yields a running
time bound of O(m2k(n + 1)n) = O(m2n2k). Hence, the overall running time is bounded
by O(n3k3m3).
An instance with a single-peaked input profile of M-Multiwinner for the approval
misrepresentation function reduces to Max-Bal-1-RS by the same transformation as de-
scribed in Section 5.2.1. We have a vertical line for every candidate, and a horizontal interval
for each voter v reaching from the leftmost candidate with r(v, c) = 0 and to the rightmost
such candidate. The crucial observation is, that minimizing the total misrepresentation for
M-Multiwinner is equivalent to maximizing the number of voters that are represented by
candidates with misrepresentation zero and, hence, to maximizing the number of covered
intervals in the Max-Bal-1-RS instance. Altogether, we arrive at the main result of this
section.
Theorem 10. M-Multiwinner for the approval misrepresentation function and single-
peaked input profiles can be decided in O(n3m3k3) time.
Recall that an instance of Minimax M-Multiwinner with R > 0 can be reduced to
an instance of M-Multiwinner with R′ = 0 and approval misrepresentation function by
setting for each voter v and each candidate c the misrepresentation value to 0, if r(v, c) ≤ R,
and to 1 otherwise (see Observations 1 and 2). Altogether, we arrive at the following.
Proposition 5. An instance of Minimax M-Multiwinner with a single-peaked profile
(and an arbitrary misrepresentation function) can be solved in O(n3m3k3) time.
5.2.2 NP-Hardness of M-Multiwinner for a Single-Peaked Election
Contrasting the polynomial-time solvability results for the other three considered prob-
lems, we show that there is an integer-valued misrepresentation function such that M-
Multiwinner is NP-complete even restricted to instances with a single-peaked input pro-
file. More specifically, we show that M-Multiwinner is NP-hard for single-peaked input
profiles and integer-valued misrepresentation functions such that the maximum misrepresen-
tation value of a voter is bounded from above by a polynomial in the number of candidates.
Note that for establishing the NP-hardness we have to allow that a voter can assign the
same misrepresentation value to several candidates.
The NP-hardness follows by a reduction from a restricted variant of Exact 3-Cover.
Restricted Exact 3-Cover (rX3C)
Input: A family S := {S1, . . . , Sm} of sets over elements E := {e1, . . . , en} such
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that every set from S has size 3 and every element of E occurs in exactly three
sets.
Question: Is there a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that every element of E occurs in
exactly one set of S ′ and
⋃
S∈S′ S = E?
Such a set S ′ is called an exact 3-cover of E. Since in all yes-instances n is a multiple of
3, in what follows we assume that n is divisible by 3. The NP-hardness of rX3C follows
from an NP-hardness reduction for the case that every element occurs in at most three
subsets (Garey & Johnson, 1979) and a construction to extend this NP-hardness result to
the case that every element occurs in exactly three subsets (Gonzalez, 1985).
Theorem 11. M-Multiwinner is NP-hard for single-peaked input profiles and an integer-
valued misrepresentation function even if the maximum misrepresentation value of every
voter is polynomial in the number of candidates (and every winner represents exactly three
voters).
Proof. We use the following notation. Consider an rX3C instance (S, E). For an element
e ∈ E that occurs in the three subsets Si, Sj, and Sk with i < j < k, we say that the first
occurrence of e is in Si, the second occurrence is in Sj, and the third occurrence is in Sk.
For an rX3C instance (S, E), define an M-MW instance as follows. The set of candidates
is
C := E ∪ {sj | Sj ∈ S}
and the multiset of voters is
V := {vxi | ei ∈ E and x ∈ {1, 2, 3}} ∪ {fi | ei ∈ E}.
That is, there is a candidate for each element and each subset and there are four voters for
each element. Next, we specify the misrepresentation functions of the voters:
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} r(fi, ei) := 0
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, c ∈ C \ {ei} r(fi, c) := 2n
2 + 1
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 1 ≤ z ≤ i r(vxi , ez) := i+ z − 1
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, z > i r(vxi , ez) := 2n
2 + 1
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if the xth occurrence of ei is in Sj r(v
x
i , sj) := 0
else r(vxi , sj) := 1
Finally, set the misrepresentation bound to R := 2n2 and let the number of winners be
k := n/3 + n. Before showing the correctness of the reduction, we discuss three crucial
properties of the construction.
First, we verify that the profile is single-peaked witnessed by the societal order
s1 ⊐ · · · ⊐ sm ⊐ e1 ⊐ · · · ⊐ en.
For every voter fi single-peakedness is obvious since his misrepresentation is 0 for one
candidate and 2n2+1 for every other candidate. For every vxi , within the candidate set E,
the misrepresentation function decreases monotonously when we move from en to e1 along
the societal axis: For z > i, this is obvious since the misrepresentation remains constant at
the value 2n2+1 and for z ≤ i the misrepresentation value is i+z−1 and hence the function
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clearly assumes smaller values for decreasing values of z. This settles the single-peakedness
for the “range” from e1 to en. To see the overall single-peakedness, first note that for e1
the misrepresentation of every vxi is at least 1. Then, since the misrepresentation is 1 for
all but one of the candidates from {s1, . . . , sm} and 0 for the remaining candidates, the
single-peakedness for every vxi follows.
Second, since there are 4n voters and k = (4n)/3, exactly three voters have to be
assigned to every winning candidate of a solution.
Third, we show that the four voters that can be best represented by candidate ei are
fi, v
1
i , v
2
i , v
3
i . More specifically, we show the following.
Observation 4. For every ei and x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, r(v
x
i , ei) < r(y, ei) for every y ∈ V \({fi}∪
{v1i } ∪ {v
2
i } ∪ {v
3
i }).
To see the correctness, observe that for every fixed a ∈ {1, . . . , n}, r(vxa , ea) = 2a − 1
and for every x′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}
• for 1 ≤ b < a, r(vx
′
b , ea) = 2n
2 + 1 > 2a− 1 ,
• for a < b ≤ n, r(vx
′
b , ea) = a+ b− 1 > 2a− 1, and
• for b 6= a, r(fb, ea) = 2n
2 − 1 > 2a− 1.
Now, we show the following.
Claim: There is an exact 3-cover for (S, E) if and only if there is a set of
k = 4n/3 candidates that can represent all voters with total misrepresentation
R = 2n2 such that exactly three voters are assigned to one candidate.
“⇒” Given an exact 3-cover S ′ ⊆ S, we show that the set {sj | Sj ∈ S
′} ∪ E of candidates
is a winning set as required by the claim. The corresponding mapping is as follows.
• For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the voter fi is assigned to the candidate ei.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if ei occurs for the xth time in Sj ∈ S
′, then vxi is
assigned to sj, else v
x
i is assigned to ei.
Since in the exact 3-cover every element is covered exactly once, it follows that every voter
is assigned to exactly one candidate and every winning candidate “represents” three voters.
More specifically, for the three voters v1i , v
2
i , and v
3
i corresponding to the three occurrences
of the element ei, one of them is represented by the candidate corresponding to the solution
set in which ei occurs and the two other voters by the candidate ei (the third candidate
represented by ei is fi). It remains to compute the total misrepresentation of this solution.
Due to the definition, every candidate sj represents all three voters with misrepresentation
0. Moreover, every candidate ei represents fi with misrepresentation 0 and two voters from
{v1i , v
2
i , v
3
i } with misrepresentation r(v
x
i , ei) = i+ i− 1 = 2i− 1 for x ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Hence, the
total misrepresentation is
n∑
i=1
2(2i − 1) = 2n(n+ 1)− 2n = 2n2. (5)
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“⇐” Consider a size-k set C ′ ⊆ C of winners that represent all voters with total misrepre-
sentation R = 2n2. Since for every voter fi, the only candidate that can represent fi with
misrepresentation at most R is ei, it follows that E ⊆ C
′. Recall that due to the M-criterion,
every candidate must represent exactly three voters. Thus, every candidate ei ∈ E must
represent two further voters (besides fi). Clearly, a lower bound for the total misrepresenta-
tion is achieved in the case when we assign to every ei ∈ E two further voters which can be
represented by ei at least as good as any other voters. Due to Observation 4, two such voters
are from {v1i , v
2
i , v
3
i }. Moreover, according to Equation 5 the corresponding lower bound for
the total misrepresentation matches the total misrepresentation R = 2n2. Since assigning
ei to any voter other than {v
1
i , v
2
i , v
3
i } would lead to a strictly higher misrepresentation (Ob-
servation 4), this implies that ei is assigned to exactly two voters from {v
1
i , v
2
i , v
3
i }. Finally,
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there remains one voter vxi that must be represented by a candidate
from C ′ \E with misrepresentation zero. Since |C ′ \E| = n/3 and a candidate sj can only
represent a voter vxi with misrepresentation 0 if the element ei occurs in Sj, i.e., the sets
corresponding to the candidates in C ′ \ E must form an exact 3-cover.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
We start with summarizing the relevance of the results of this work. This will be followed
by a discussion of closely related problems and models that might be investigated in future
research. We conclude with several questions that directly follow from our results.
6.1 Relevance of Results
The computation of a set of candidates that “fully proportionally” represent the society has
applications in many relevant settings. The main problem with the suggested approaches
in the extant literature is that the corresponding combinatorial problems are NP-hard, that
is, they cannot be solved efficiently in general. This raises the question whether these
approaches despite the theoretically proven advantages (see, e.g., a detailed discussion of
those in Brams, 2008) are useless in practice.
One approach is of course to try to escape high complexity by modifying the concept
while keeping it still meaningful. In this regard we tried to change the way the total
misrepresentation is calculated taking the minimax (or Rawlsian) approach. This appeared
not to help in the general case—all problems remain computationally hard—however, it
partially helped for single-peaked elections: while the classical Monroe scheme remains
NP-hard, its minimax version can be solved in polynomial time.
In general, there are several ways to deal with NP-hard problems. For example, NP-
hardness is based on the worst-case analysis and hence one might be able to develop algo-
rithms that work efficiently for most instances. However, although unlikely, it still might
happen that the outcome of an election leads to a hard instance. Then, this would lead to
the situation of political impasse with unpredictable consequences.
Another common approach to tackle NP-hard problems is to invoke approximation al-
gorithms. While for some scenarios like in the context of resource allocation with sharable
items a nearly optimal solution might be sufficient and approximation algorithms are mean-
ingful (Lu & Boutilier, 2011; Skowron, Faliszewski, & Slinko, 2012); for other scenarios, like
political elections, the use of approximation algorithms is hard to imagine. A voting rule is
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a constitutional matter: whatever it is, it must be adhered to. Under the current legislation
any candidate or a party can ask for a recount and, if an approximation to a voting rule
was used, they may require using another approximation which they can argue give a better
representation. It is not hard to imagine prolonged court proceedings on such matters.
Based on the previous discussion, it seems clearly desirable to identify well-specified
settings for which an optimal solution can be computed efficiently. This will extend the
applicability of the fully proportional representation to such settings. In this regard, we
conducted an investigation in two different directions. The first was the class of settings in
which some parameters are small (parameterized complexity analysis). The second approach
was to restrict attention to single-peaked domains.
Regarding the parameterized complexity of the four studied problems, most of our re-
sults are negative (see Table 1). In particular, for the natural and well-motivated parameter
the number of winners, the corresponding problems turned out to be W[2]-complete. If,
however, in addition there is a winner set that can represent all voters with a small total
misrepresentation, three of the four problems become tractable for the Borda misrepre-
sentation function. Moreover, the fixed-parameter tractability results with respect to the
number of voters and the number of candidates, respectively, are useful for such restricted
settings.
Regarding single-peaked elections, almost all of our results are positive and come with
polynomial-time algorithms (see Table 2). A possible critique of this approach is to claim
that single-peakedness is in a way an idealized model which is not robust enough. A smallest
honest mistake of a voter in filling her ballot may result in election becoming not single-
peaked. Also there may be a secondary issue in the election that is also important for some
voters which may lead to the election being “almost” single-peaked but not exactly single-
peaked. In this regard it would be interesting to investigate how difficult is to find a single-
peaked profile “closest” to the given one. For this one might employ techniques of the so-
called distance rationalizability approach (Baigent, 1987; Meskanen & Nurmi, 2008; Elkind,
Faliszewski, & Slinko, 2010a; Elkind et al., 2010b). It is thus not surprising that near single-
peakedness is now starting to be an active area of research (Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra,
& Hemaspaandra, 2011; Erdelyi, Lackner, & Pfandler, 2012). Since our algorithms show
polynomial-time solvability for the important basic case of single-peakedness, they might
be a basis for developing efficient algorithms for such extended settings.
Summarizing, our work contributes to the important topic of making fully proportional
representation ideas practical and complements the analysis of this method by Potthof and
Brams (1998), Procaccia et al. (2008) and Lu and Boutilier (2011).
6.2 Related Problems and Scenarios
Before concluding the work with several open questions, we, first, describe some relations
of the considered problems to facility location problems and, second, describe a reasonable
alternative multi-winner model. Both topics might also lead to interesting questions for
future research.
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6.2.1 Relations to Facility Location.
A basic scenario for this problem is that a company needs to choose a set of facility locations
to serve a set of customers with as little cost to them as possible. Fellows and Fernau (2011)
investigated the parameterized complexity of a variant of this problem that is closely related
to CC-Multiwinner. Basically, the facility locations can be considered as the set of
candidates, the customers as the multiset of voters and the goal is to find a set of facility
locations to serve these customers. The only difference is the cost function: In addition
to a term that resembles the misrepresentation for every voter (customer), every facility
location comes with a certain cost that is required to install the facility.
Similar to our study, Fellows and Fernau (2011) studied the parameter number k of
winners/selected facilities locations and the total cost. For the parameter k, W[2]-hardness
for CC-Multiwinner follows from the reduction given for the facility location problem.
Regarding the parameter “total cost”, the results of the two papers are not directly com-
parable. This is due to the fact that the facility location problem stipulates that there
is a minimum cost of 1 for serving a customer even at the “best” facility location (which
would be an analogue of the condition r(v, c) ≥ 1 for the misrepresentation function r).
In this case, the considered problem is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the total
cost. This might not come as a surprise since here the total cost/misrepresentation is at
least the number of voters and fixed-parameter tractability with respect to this parameter
holds for all four voting problems that we considered (Proposition 2). In contrast, with
the condition r(v, c) ≥ 0 all considered problems are at least W[2]-hard with respect to the
total misrepresentation/cost (see Table 1).
The close connection between facility location and multi-winner problems clearly seems
to deserve more attention in future work. We remark that analogues of several problems
considered in this work might also make sense in the context of the facility location problem.
For example, the Monroe model might apply for sets of facilities such that every facility can
serve about the same number of customers. Moreover, the single-peaked scenario translates,
for example, to the setting that all potential facility locations are along one main street and
each resident ranks the cost of using the facility according to the distance from that facility
to the place of his residence.
6.2.2 Multiset of Candidates Model.
There may be a compromise solution between the two systems of Chamberlin and Courant
and Monroe. We may still divide voters into equal or almost equal groups but we may assign
the same representative to more than one group of voters. Say, if there are n voters and k
representatives are to be elected we may split voters into groups of sizes ⌊n/k⌋ and ⌊n/k⌋+1
but allow the same candidate to represent more than one group. Mathematically this would
result in selecting not a set of representatives of cardinality k but a multiset of the same
cardinality. The classic Monroe (1995) example which considers subscription of newspapers
for the common room is in fact a better fit for the multiset model. Indeed, if demand, say
for Financial Times, is strong several copies of this newspaper can be subscribed to. We
will still need to use weighted voting in the assembly but in this case all weights will be
integers.
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To illustrate the difference let us consider six people electing a representative assembly
of three. Suppose our candidates must come from the set A = {a, b, c, d} and the preferences
of voters are as follows:
4 2
a c
b b
c a
d d
A set variant of Monroe scheme will give us the set of representatives {a, b, c} while from
the multiset point of view it is more natural to have a multiset {a2, c} as the answer which
could be interpreted to mean that two votes given to a and one to c. The multiset point of
view seems more natural here, indeed, b does not seem to represent anybody nicely. So the
misrepresentation will be nonzero in the set version and zero in the multiset one.
As far as we know the computational complexity for the computation of a winner in the
multiset model is unstudied so far. On a first glance, it seems conceivable that the computa-
tional complexity for the multiset model lies between the complexity for CC-Multiwinner
and M-Multiwinner. This leads to interesting questions such as whether a set of winners
according to the multiset model can be computed in polynomial time when the electorate
is single peaked.
6.3 Open Questions
Several questions arise from this work.
• For CC- and M-Multiwinner for the Borda misrepresentation function we pro-
vided algorithms showing polynomial-time solvability for a constant misrepresentation
bound R. Are these problems fixed-parameter tractable with respect to R?
• IsMinimax M-Multiwinner for the Borda misrepresentation function fixed-parameter
tractable with respect to the composite parameter (R, k)?
• For M-Multiwinner for single-peaked elections we have shown NP-hardness for
integer-valued misrepresentation functions. Is the problem fixed-parameter tractable
with respect to the number of winners k or/and with respect to the misrepresentation
bound R?
• Is M-Multiwinner for the Borda misrepresentation function polynomial-time solv-
able for single-peaked instances?
• Can the results for single-peaked elections be extended to generalized single-peakedness
(e.g., as defined by Nehring & Puppe, 2007) or to “almost” single-peaked profiles (in
some sense)? This might be of particular interest if the problem of finding the “clos-
est” single-peaked profile to a given one would turn out to be polynomial-time solvable
(for some distance on the set of profiles).
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